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THE EXTENDED STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN THE CHILD VICTIMS ACT DOES NOT APPLY TO CIVIL RIGHTS CAUSES OF ACTION PURSUANT TO 42 USC 1983; THE DUTY TO REPORT CHILD ABUSE UNDER THE SOCIAL SERVICES LAW APPLIES ONLY TO “PERSONS LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE” FOR THE CARE OF THE CHILD, WHICH DOES NOT INCLUDE TEACHERS (THIRD DEPT).

​The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Aarons, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the negligence and civil rights causes of action against the school district in this Child Victims Act suit were properly dismissed, and the Social Services Law causes of action should have been dismissed. The complaints alleged sexual abuse by a teacher. The Third Department followed the Fourth Department holding that the extended statute of limitations in the Child Victims Act did not apply to the 42 USC 1983 civil rights causes of action. The Third Department also determined the teacher was not a “person legally responsible” for the plaintiffs such that the abuse-reporting requirement in the Social Services Law applied to the school district:

It is true that CPLR 214-g contains broad language. The statute nonetheless limits the types of causes of action — i.e., claims involving child sexual abuse — that are revived and then given a new limitations period. … 42 USC § 1983 does not create any independent, substantive rights but merely provides a vehicle to enforce such rights … . As the Fourth Department reasoned, to determine whether CPLR 214-g was a related revival statute would require a court to impermissibly consider the particular facts or particular legal theory advanced by a plaintiff in a section 1983 claim (see BL Doe 3 v Female Academy of the Sacred Heart, 199 AD3d at 1422). Accordingly, we decline plaintiffs’ invitation to reject the Fourth Department’s approach as articulated in BL Doe 3 v Female Academy of the Sacred Heart … . * * *

… [C]ertain individuals must report cases of suspected abuse when reasonable cause exists that a child coming before them is an abused child (see Social Services Law § 413). Civil liability may be imposed upon these individuals who knowingly and willfully fail to make the requisite report (see Social Services Law § 420 [2]). … [F]or purposes of Social Services Law § 413, an “abused child” is one who is abused by a “parent or other person legally responsible for [a child’s] care” (Family Ct Act § 1012 [e]; see Social Services Law § 412 [1]).

The School District maintains that plaintiffs’ statutory claim should have been dismissed because Wales [defendant teacher] was not a “person legally responsible” for plaintiffs’ care at the time of the alleged abuse. … [W]hether an individual constitutes a “person legally responsible” for a child within the meaning of Family Ct Act § 1012 (e) entails the examination of various factors … . The Court of Appeals cautioned … that “persons who assume fleeting or temporary care of a child . . . or those persons who provide extended daily care of children in institutional settings, such as teachers,” should not be interpreted as a “person legally responsible” for a child’s care … . … [T]he School District cannot be liable for any alleged failure to report any abuse by Wales … . Dolgas v Wales, 2023 NY Slip Op 01830, Third Dept 4-6-23

Practice Point: Here the school district was sued under the Child Victims Act alleging sexual abuse by a teacher. The civil rights causes of action pursuant to 42 USC 1983 are not subject to the extended statute of limitations in the Child Victims Act and, therefore, those causes of action were properly dismissed.

Practice Point: A teacher is not a “person legally responsible” for the care of a child within the meaning of the Family Court Act. Therefore the causes of action under the Social Services Law alleging the school district failed to report abuse by a teacher should have been dismissed.

 

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ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT CORPORATION WAS NOT SERVED WITH THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT, THE CORPORATE DEFENDANT “APPEARED INFORMALLY” THROUGH THE CEO’S AFFIDAVIT; PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO A DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST THE CORPORATION (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that, although the defendant corporation was not served with the summons and complaint, it “appeared informally” in the action and, therefore, plaintiffs’ motion for a default judgment should have been granted. The “informal appearance” was in the form of the corporate CEO’s affidavit:

… “‘[I]n addition to the formal appearances listed in CPLR 320(a), the law continues to recognize the so-called “informal” appearance'” .. . An informal appearance “‘comes about when the defendant, although not having taken any of the steps that would officially constitute an appearance under CPLR 320(a), nevertheless participates in the case in some way relating to the merits'” … . “When a defendant participates in a lawsuit on the merits, he or she indicates an intention to submit to the court’s jurisdiction over the action, and by appearing informally in this manner, the defendant confers in personam jurisdiction on the court” … . “[A]n appearance of the defendant is equivalent to personal service of the summons upon him [or her], unless an objection to jurisdiction under [CPLR 3211(a)(8)] is asserted by motion or in the answer as provided in rule 3211” (CPLR 320[b]).

“The occasion for [an informal] appearance [is] an infrequent thing” … . However, an informal appearance may occur even where the defendant is not served with process , where an individual defendant affirmatively states that he or she is only acting in his or her capacity as an officer of a corporate defendant … . Travelon, Inc. v Maekitan, 2023 NY Slip Op 01816, Second Dept 4-5-23

Practice Point: Although infrequent, New York still recognizes an “informal appearance” in an action, here through an affidavit submitted by the CEO of a corporate defendant. Because of the informal appearance, plaintiffs were entitled to a default judgment, even though the defendant was never served with a summons and complaint.

 

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PLAINTIFFS OBTAINED A NEW JERSEY DEFAULT JUDGMENT IN A BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION AGAINST THREE DEFENDANTS WHO ARE JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE; PLANTIFFS NEED ONLY SERVE ONE OF THE DEFENDANTS TO ENFORCE THE FOREIGN JUDGMENT AGAINST THAT DEFENDANT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiffs, who obtained a New Jersey default judgment against three defendants, need only serve one of the defendants in this action to enforce the foreign judgment:

In October 2013, the plaintiffs contracted with the defendant Tirepool, LLC … for the purchase of a used car. The contract was negotiated by the defendants Jeff Massicott and Vivian Wallace, the owners/managers of Tirepool. The defendants breached the contract and retained the plaintiffs’ down payment. … [T]he plaintiffs commenced an action against the defendants in the Superior Court of New Jersey (hereinafter the New Jersey action). The defendants failed to answer the complaint, and the plaintiffs obtained a default judgment against the defendants in the principal sum of $26,548.32. …

CPLR 1501 provides: “Where less than all of the named defendants in an action based upon a joint obligation, contract or liability are served with the summons, the plaintiff may proceed against the defendants served, unless the court otherwise directs, and if the judgment is for the plaintiff it may be taken against all the defendants.” Here, the defendants are jointly and severally liable for the judgment in the New Jersey action and, therefore, the plaintiffs are permitted to proceed against Wallace without effectuating service on the other defendants.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was for summary judgment in lieu of complaint insofar as asserted against Wallace. Obed v Tirepool, LLC, 2023 NY Slip Op 01802, Second Dept 4-5-23

Practice Point: Here there was a foreign default judgment against three defendants who are jointly and severally liable. Plaintiffs only served one of the defendants with a summons in lieu of complaint to enforce the foreign judgment. Plaintiffs did not need to serve the other two defendants and could proceed against the defendant who was served.

 

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PLAINTIFF FAILED TO SHOW UP FOR THE SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION AND A DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS GRANTED; IN MOVING TO VACATE THE DEFAULT, PLAINTIFF DID NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT PROOF OF LAW OFFICE FAILURE AND DID NOT EXPLAIN ITS DELAY IN SEEKING TO VACATE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court in this foreclosure action, determined plaintiff did not demonstrate an adequate excuse (law office failure) for not attending the settlement conference and plaintiff’s motion to vacate the default judgment should not have been granted:

… [T]he plaintiff’s allegation of law office failure was conclusory and unsubstantiated. In an affirmation in support of the motion … to vacate the order of dismissal, the plaintiff’s counsel described her office’s standard practices and procedures for receiving and processing notices and orders, and posited that her office had not received notice of the scheduled conference because there were “no notes, scanned images, or calendar steps” in the files that she reviewed. The plaintiff … failed to provide an affidavit from anyone with personal knowledge of the purported law office failure, provide any details regarding such failure, or provide any other evidence of the system’s purported breakdown that led to counsel’s nonappearance at the conference … . Moreover, the plaintiff failed to provide a reasonable excuse for its delay in moving to vacate the order of dismissal … . Since the plaintiff failed to proffer a reasonable excuse its default, it is unnecessary to determine whether the plaintiff demonstrated the existence of a potentially meritorious cause of action (see CPLR 5015[a][1] …). HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Hutchinson, 2023 NY Slip Op 01782, Second Dept 4-5-23

Practice Point: Here the claim that plaintiff missed the settlement conference due to law office failure was not supported by proof from a person with first hand knowledge. The motion to vacate the default judgment should not have been granted.

 

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RE: DETERMINING THE CORRECT JURISDICTION FOR STATUTE-OF-LIMITATIONS PURPOSES, THE ACCRUAL OF A BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION ALLEGING PURELY ECONOMIC INJURY IS USUALLY IN THE “PLACE OF INJURY,” WHICH IS USUALLY WHERE THE PLAINTIFF RESIDES (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a decision too complex to fairly summarize here, noted that for breach of contract actions alleging purely economic injury the claims accrue in the “place of injury,” usually plaintiff’s residence:

… Supreme Court should not have found that the claims accrued in New York and were timely under New York’s six-year statute of limitations. In contract cases involving a purely economic injury, accrual is determined by the “place of injury,” which usually is determined by applying the “plaintiff-residence” rule; this rule asks where the plaintiff resides and where it feels the economic impact of the loss … . MLRN LLC v U.S. Bank, N.A., 2023 NY Slip Op 01748, First Dept 3-30-23

Practice Point: A breach of contract action alleging purely economic injury usually accrues in the “place of injury” which is usually where plaintiff resides.

 

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HERE THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT WHEN THE PLAINTIFFS BECAME AWARE OF THE ALLEGED FRAUD; THEREFORE THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS TIME-BARRED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there was a question of fact concerning when the plaintiffs became aware of the alleged fraud. Therefore the complaint should not have been dismissed as time-barred:

Fraud claims must be commenced within “the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff . . . discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it” (CPLR 213[8]). * * *

Assuming, arguendo, that defendants met their prima facie burden on the motion, an issue of fact exists as to whether plaintiffs were on inquiry notice of the fraud more than two years before they commenced the action … . Murray v Stone, 2023 NY Slip Op 01749, First Dept 3-30-23

Practice Point:  A fraud action must be brought within six years of accrual or two years of discovery of the fraud.

 

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WHEN A JUDGE MAKES A WRONG RULING WHICH CANNOT BE APPEALED BECAUSE IT WAS NOT PROMPTED BY A MOTION, A MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER PURSUANT TO CPLR 5015 IS AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY; THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE CAN BE APPEALED, AS WAS SUCCESSFULLY DONE HERE (FIRST DEPT).

​The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined Supreme Court should not have dismissed the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3216 because no motion to dismiss had been made and plaintiff was not given any warning or an opportunity to respond. The court noted that when a judge makes a wrong ruling, here the dismissal of the complaint, the proper procedure is a motion to set aside the order pursuant to CPLR 5015. The motion to set aside should have been granted:

A trial court has inherent power, as well as statutory power under CPLR 5015, to set aside an order on appropriate grounds … . “Vacating the dismissal order is consistent with the public policy of this State to dispose of cases on their merits and upholds the principle that a trial court’s power to dismiss an action sua sponte should be used sparingly and only in extraordinary circumstances” … .

There were no extraordinary circumstances warranting the complaint’s dismissal. Wohnberger v Lucani, 2023 NY Slip Op 01758, First Dept 3-30-23

Practice Point: Here no motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3216 was made, but the judge dismissed the complaint sua sponte. A motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint pursuant CPLR 5015 was made and denied. The denial was then successfully appealed here. This is the appropriate remedy when no appeal lies from the original order because the order was not issued pursuant to a motion.

 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND ITS REPLY TO A COUNTERCLAIM TO ADD THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT WAS NOT PALPABLY IMPROPER AND DEFENDANT SHOWED THERE WAS NO PREJUDICE BY NOT OPPOSING THE MOTION TO AMEND (SECOND DEPT).

​The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion to amend a reply to a counterclaim to add the statute-of-limitations affirmative defense should have been granted, noting that mere lateness is not an adequate ground for denial of a motion to amend. The court also noted that defendant’s failure to oppose the motion demonstrated a lack of prejudice:

“In the absence of prejudice or surprise resulting directly from the delay in seeking leave, applications to amend or supplement a pleading ‘are to be freely granted unless the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit'” (… see CPLR 3025[b]). “The burden of demonstrating prejudice or surprise, or that a proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit, falls upon the party opposing the motion” … . “The determination to permit or deny amendment is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court” … .

Here, the record reflects that the proposed amendment was neither palpably insufficient nor patently devoid of merit. Moreover, while the plaintiff’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) was made more than eight months after its original verified reply, “‘[m]ere lateness is not a barrier to the amendment. It must be lateness coupled with significant prejudice to the other side, the very elements of the laches doctrine'” … . In this case, having failed to oppose the motion, [defendant] failed to satisfy its burden of demonstrating any prejudice or surprise. Toiny, LLC v Rahim, 2023 NY Slip Op 01702, Second Dept 3-29-23

Practice Point: Motions to amend pleadings should rarely be denied. Mere lateness in moving to amend is not an adequate reason for denial.

 

THE COVID EXECUTIVE ORDERS TOLLING THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS APPLY TO THE TIME FOR ANSWERING A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN LIEU OF COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the COVID executive orders tolling the statute of limitations applied to the time to oppose a motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint:

In Brash v Richards, this Court determined that Executive Order 202.8 and the subsequent executive orders acted to toll those specific time limits contained in the CPLR and listed in the executive orders … . Executive Order 202.8 and the subsequent executive orders “appear to apply to the service of the notice of appearance” … , but “do[ ] not expressly apply to toll the defendant’s time to serve an answer” … . However, given the hybrid nature of the “motion-action” under CPLR 3213, in which the filing of answering papers is akin to the service of a notice of appearance or an answer … , combined with the desire to preserve the status quo for litigants during the COVID-19 pandemic … , under Executive Order 202.8 and the subsequent executive orders, neither defendant was required to appear and file answering papers … . Blue Lagoon, LLC v Reisman, 2023 NY Slip Op 01657, Second Dept 3-29-23

Practice Point: COVID executive orders tolling statutes of limitations apply to the time to answer a motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint.