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THE NOTICE OF CLAIM IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT SUIT AGAINST THE STATE SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED WHEN THE ABUSE OCCURRED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) the Court of Claims in this Child Victims Act (CVA) suit, determined the notice of claim sufficiently alleged the time when the alleged sexual abuse of claimant took place in a state psychiatric center. The court noted that the respondeat superior cause of action should be dismissed because any sexual abuse by a state employee would not be within the scope of employment as a matter of law:

… [T]he Court of Claims incorrectly determined that the claimant was required to allege the exact date on which the sexual abuse occurred … . The claimant’s allegations, including that the abuse occurred in 1993 while she was 14 years old and attending a gym class at Sagamore, were sufficient to satisfy the “time when” requirement of Court of Claims Act § 11(b) in this claim brought pursuant to the CVA … . Wagner v State of New York, 2023 NY Slip Op 01546, Second Dept 3-22-23

Practice Point; Here in this Child Victims Act suit, the allegation that the sexual abuse took place in 1993, when claimant was 14 and attending gym class met the “time when” requirement for a notice of claim.

 

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IN THIS NO-FAULT INSURANCE CASE, THE INSURER REQUESTED AN EXAMINATION UNDER OATH (EUO) WITHOUT AFFORDING THE MEDICAL PROVIDER SPECIFIC, OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE REQUEST; SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED TO THE INSURER (FIRST DEPT).

​The First Department, reversing Supreme Court in this no-fault insurance case, determined the insurer did not provide the medical provider with objective justification for its request for an examination under oath (EUO). Summary judgment should not have been awarded to the insurer:

Although plaintiff timely requested an EUO and subsequently issued a timely denial … , the motion court erred in granting summary judgment. 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 (e) requires an EUO request be based on application of objective standards, and that the insurer must have a specific objective justification. Summary judgment is premature under CPLR 3212 where an insurer fails to provide a medical provider with its objective justification for requesting the EUO … . This Court has explained that the insurer’s reason for the EUO is essential for medical providers to oppose an insurer’s summary judgment motion, and that information is in the exclusive knowledge and control of the insurer … . Country-Wide Ins. Co. v Alicea, 2023 NY Slip Op 01474, First Dept 3-21-23

Practice Point: In a no-fault insurance matter, the insurer’s request for an examination under oath (EUO) must be supported by “specific objective justification.” Here the failure to afford the medical provider objective justification precluded summary judgment in favor of the insurer.

 

PLAINTIFF DID NOT ALLEGE SUFFICIENT CONTACTS WITH NEW YORK TO SUPPORT LONG-ARM JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT IN ISRAEL; THE EVIDENCE DID NOT JUSTIFY JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY (FIRST DEPT).

​The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff did not demonstrate a basis for long-arm jurisdiction over the defendant in Israel, and did not make a “sufficient start” to justify jurisdictional discovery:

Plaintiff, a Rhode Island corporation with its principal place of business in Nevada, commenced this action against defendant, a resident of Israel, alleging that defendant breached his fiduciary duty to plaintiff by failing to perform his marketing and management duties while serving as plaintiff’s director. …

… [D]efendant submitted evidence to show that he had no contacts with New York, had not been in New York since mid-2018, and that the specific transactions alleged in the complaint involved business contacts in Texas and Rhode Island, not New York. In opposition, plaintiff did not dispute defendant’s showing, but submitted evidence that it leased an office and opened a bank account in New York with defendant’s approval and assistance, and an affidavit of its chief executive officer who made vague and unsubstantiated assertions that defendant did business on plaintiff’s behalf in New York at unspecified times with unnamed employees and customers, which was insufficient to establish long-arm jurisdiction … . Because plaintiff failed to make a “sufficient start, via tangible evidence,” of showing that defendant transacted any business in New York having any substantial relationship to the claim alleged in the complaint, jurisdictional discovery was not warranted, and the complaint should have been dismissed … . Noris Med., Inc. v Siev, 2023 NY Slip Op 01482, First Dept 3-21-23

Practice Point: The alleged connections with New York did not state a basis for long-arm jurisdiction over the defendant in Israel.

Practice Point: The evidence did not make a “sufficient start” such that jurisdictional discovery was warranted.

 

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THE COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR UNPAID OVERTIME WITHOUT SPECIFYING PARTICULAR DATES OR WEEKS; AFFIDAVITS ARE NOT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE WHICH WILL SUPPORT A “DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE” MOTION TO DISMISS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the complaint stated a cause of action for unpaid overtime wages pursuant to the Labor Law and the proof submitted by defendant did not support a motion to dismiss based on documentary evidence:

Plaintiffs’ complaint sufficiently states a claim for unpaid overtime wages in violation of Labor Law §§ 191 and 663 and 12 NYCRR 142-2.2 … . Plaintiffs allege that they were not compensated for hours spent before and after their shift, loading company vehicles and receiving job assignments, before traveling to construction sites throughout the New York City region … . Although the complaint does not contain the particular dates or weeks that plaintiffs were allegedly underpaid, it provides sufficient notice of their causes of action for unpaid wages and overtime based on pre-shift and post-shift work performed at defendant’s yard … .

In addition, defendant’s documentary evidence is insufficient to support a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(1). Dismissal on the basis of documentary evidence is appropriate only if that evidence “utterly refutes plaintiff’s factual allegations, conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law” … . Affidavits are not documentary evidence that can support a 3211(a)(1) motion … . The documentary evidence fails to utterly refute plaintiffs’ claim that they were not timely paid overtime compensation. Despite defendant’s assertions, it is unclear whether the daily reports submitted with its motion properly reflect the alleged work performed before plaintiffs’ shifts began or after their shifts had purportedly ended. Rosario v Hallen Constr. Co., Inc., 2023 NY Slip Op 01490, First Dept 3-21-23

Practice Point: Here the complaint stated a cause of action for unpaid overtime despite the absence of specific dates or week when plaintiffs were allegedly underpaid.

Practice Point: A motion to dismiss based on documentary evidence is not supported when the documents are affidavits.

 

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INTERSTATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IS AN ISSUE WHICH MUST BE RAISED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT TO BE PRESERVED FOR APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS; HERE A NEW JERSEY TRANSIT BUS COLLIDED WITH A CAR DRIVEN BY A NEW YORK RESIDENT IN THE LINCOLN TUNNEL AND THE TRIAL WAS HELD IN NEW YORK; ALTHOUGH THE INTERSTATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DEFENSE WAS VALIDATED BY THE US SUPREME COURT IN 2019, THE ISSUE WAS NOT RAISED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Singas, over a two-judge dissenting opinion, determined the sovereign immunity defense raised for the first time on appeal by New Jersey in this traffic accident case was not preserved for appeal to the Court of Appeals. The accident happened in the Lincoln Tunnel and involved the New York resident plaintiff and a bus owned by the defendant New Jersey Transit Corporation. New Jersey argued that the US Supreme Court had changed the law in 2019, allowing a state to preclude suit in another state absent consent thereby presenting a constitutional issue not subject to the preservation requirement. The Court of Appeals rejected that argument:

The question before us is whether we have power to hear this appeal under NY Constitution article VI, § 3 and CPLR 5601 (b) (1). To answer this threshold issue, we must consider the jurisdictional nature of interstate sovereign immunity to ascertain whether defendants’ sovereign immunity defense is exempt from our general preservation rules. We conclude that a state must preserve its interstate sovereign immunity defense by raising it before the trial court, and no exception to the general preservation rule applies. Because defendants asserted their sovereign immunity defense for the first time on appeal after the United States Supreme Court decided Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v Hyatt (587 US &mdash, 139 S Ct 1485 [2019] [hereinafter Hyatt III]), the argument is unpreserved in this case and there is no directly involved constitutional question supporting this appeal as of right. The appeal should therefore be dismissed. Henry v New Jersey Tr. Corp., 2023 NY Slip Op 01466, CtApp 3-21-23

Practice Point: Interstate sovereign immunity means one state cannot be sued in the courts of another state absent consent. That form of sovereign immunity was validated by the US Supreme Court in 2019. The issue, however, must be preserved by raising it in the trial court before the Court of Appeals will consider it.

 

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TWO DISSENTERS ARGUED THE UNPRESERVED ISSUE, WHICH INVOLVED SETTLED LAW, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED ON APPEAL (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, over a two-justice dissent, considered an unpreserved issue on appeal (the date from which prejudgment interest begins to run). The dissenting justices argued the unpreserved issue involved settled law and there was, therefore, no reason to consider it:

The majority assumes that the issue is unpreserved but reaches the merits of claimant’s contention through application of an exception to the preservation rule … . In other words, on this appeal as of right from a final judgment (see CPLR 5701 [a] [1]), the majority is not limiting this Court’s scope of review to those matters brought up for review pursuant to CPLR 5501 (a). We respectfully disagree with the majority to the extent that it elects to address an unpreserved issue of statewide interest inasmuch as it does nothing more than adhere to this Court’s well-settled and decades-long precedent on that particular issue . In short, under the circumstances of this case, we disagree with the majority’s decision to invoke what should be a very rare exception to rules of preservation only just to double down on our long-standing precedent. Indeed, by reaching claimant’s contention challenging that precedent, the majority fails to fully recognize that the policy reasons underlying the preservation rule, and the … rarity of times when we except from it, are “especially acute when the new issue seeks change in a long-established common-law rule,” as is the case here … . Sabine v State of New York, 2023 NY Slip Op 01455, Fourth Dept 3-17-23

Practice Point: The majority considered an unpreserved issue on appeal which involved a well-settled area of the law. Two dissenters argued the case did not justify ignoring the preservation requirement, which should be a rare occurrence reserved to new issues seeking change in the common law.

 

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PLAINTIFF’S ACTION RELIED ON EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE AND WAS NOT AN ACTION FOR THE PAYMENT OF MONEY ONLY WHICH CAN BE BROUGHT BY SUMMONS IN LIEU OF A COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO CPLR 3213 (FOURTH DEPT),

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s cause of action was not for the payment of money only (CPLR 3213) for which a summons in lieu of  a complaint was an appropriate vehicle:

As proof of the agreement to reduce defendant’s liability under the guaranty and the amount of that reduction, plaintiff relies on evidence extrinsic to the instrument consisting of representations in the affidavit of its chief operating officer, deposit receipt printouts from the online system of plaintiff’s bank, and a guaranty balance chart apparently generated by plaintiff showing the calculation of defendant’s revised liability.

In our view, “[g]oing that far afield from the [financial] instrument itself does not appear to comport with the simple standards” embodied in the statute and related case law … . Indeed, inasmuch as plaintiff’s moving papers demonstrate that outside evidence beyond “simple proof of nonpayment or a similar de minimis deviation from the face of the document[s]” is needed to determine the amount due, we conclude that “[p]laintiff’s action falls far short of satisfying the [CPLR] 3213 threshold requirement” … . Counsel Fin. II LLC v Bortnick, 2023 NY Slip Op 01441, Fourth Dept 3-17-23

Practice Point: Plaintiff relied on extrinsic evidence. The action was not, therefore, for the “payment of money only” within the meaning of CPLR 3213 and was not properly brought by a summons in lieu of complaint.

 

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​ THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED AN ORAL JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT BUT DID NOT ALLEGE THE PARTIES AGREED TO SHARE THE LOSSES; THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS THEREFORE APPLIED AND THE COMPLAINT WAS DISMISSED; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO ALLEGE THE PARTIES AGREED TO SHARE THE LOSSES SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint should have been granted. The initial breach of contract complaint was dismissed because it was not alleged the parties to the oral joint venture agreed to share the losses (therefore the statute of frauds applied to the agreement). The amendment sought to include the allegation the parties agreed to share the losses:

… Supreme Court improperly denied the plaintiff’s motion on the basis that the breach of contract causes of action in the amended complaint had previously been dismissed … . Moreover, under the circumstances here, the court should have granted the plaintiff’s motion. The defendants cannot be prejudiced or surprised by the proposed amendments, which were premised upon the same facts, transactions, or occurrences alleged in the amended complaint and “simply sought to cure the deficiencies cited by the Supreme Court in its earlier order which resulted in the dismissal” … . Further, the plaintiff explained that the omission of a loss-sharing allegation from the amended complaint was inadvertent, and he diligently sought to amend the pleading to correct the defect … . Benjamin v 270 Malcolm X Dev., Inc., 2023 NY Slip Op 01275, Second Dept 3-15-23

Practice Point: In the absence of prejudice amendment of a complaint should be allowed. Here the complaint was dismissed because plaintiff did not allege the parties agreed to share the losses in an oral joint venture agreement which triggered the statute of frauds. Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint to allege the parties agreed to share the losses should have been granted.

 

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THE NOTICE OF CLAIM IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT LAWSUIT AGAINST THE STATE ALLEGING SEXUAL ABUSE AT A PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL SUFFICIENTLY DESCRIBED THE TIME PERIOD WHEN THE ABUSE ALLEGEDLY TOOK PLACE; THE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing the Court of Claims in this Child Victims Act action, determined that the notice of claim sufficiently described when the alleged sexual abuse took place at the state’s psychiatric center:

The claimant commenced this claim against the State of New York to recover damages resulting from alleged acts of sexual assault committed against her, beginning when she was 15 years old, by an employee of Sagamore Children’s Psychiatric Center (hereinafter Sagamore). * * *

… [T]he claim was sufficiently specific to satisfy the pleading requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11(b). The claim alleged negligent hiring, training, and supervision of an employee who had subjected the claimant to multiple sexual assaults at Sagamore between June 5, 2013, and September 16, 2013—a period of approximately three months—while the claimant was a patient at Sagamore. This was sufficiently specific to enable the State to investigate the claim promptly and ascertain its liability … . D. G. v State of New York, 2023 NY Slip Op 01183, Second Dept 3-8-23

Practice Point: Here the notice of claim sufficiently described the three-month time-frame when the alleged sexual abuse of the plaintiff took place at a state psychiatric hospital, The Child Victims Act lawsuit should not have been dismissed.

 

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THE CAUSES OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION (OF THE PLAINTIFF-STUDENT) AND NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO WARN (THE PLAINTIFF-STUDENT) SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT CASE; THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED PLAINTIFF WAS SENT TO A PRIEST NOT EMPLOYED BY THE SCHOOL FOR DISCIPLINE AND WAS MOLESTED BY THE PRIEST (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the negligent supervision and negligent failure to warn causes of action against defendant Catholic school should not have been dismissed in this Child Victims Act case. Plaintiff alleged he was sent by the school to a priest, who was not employed by the school, for discipline. Plaintiff alleged he was molested by the priest and the school knew or should have known of the priest’s propensity:

The complaint alleges … the defendant knew or should have known of the priest’s propensity to molest children, that the defendant had a duty to exercise the same duty of care of supervision over its minor students as a reasonably prudent parent would, and that the defendant breached its duty to adequately supervise the plaintiff which caused him to be sexually abused by the priest. …  … [T]he fact that the sexual abuse occurred off school premises does not require dismissal of the cause of action alleging negligent supervision since, here, the plaintiff has alleged that the defendant released the plaintiff into a potentially hazardous situation and directed him to see a certain priest for discipline knowing that the priest had a propensity to sexually abuse children … . … [T]he criminal intervention of a third party may be a reasonably foreseeable consequence of circumstances created by the defendant, for example where, as here, the plaintiff was permitted to meet with the priest, a person who allegedly had a propensity to abuse children, alone and behind closed doors … .

… Supreme Court erred in determining that the cause of action alleging negligent failure to warn was subject to dismissal because it was duplicative of the cause of action alleging negligent supervision. … [T]hese causes of action are based on distinctive facts, one based on failing to warn the plaintiff about the priest and the other based on the defendant’s failure to adequately supervise the plaintiff … . Sullivan v St. Ephrem R.C. Parish Church, 2023 NY Slip Op 01207, Second Dept 3-8-23

Practice Point: Here plaintiff alleged the Catholic school sent him to a priest, who was not employed by the school, for school-related discipline and the priest molested him. The causes of action for negligent supervision of the plaintiff-student and failure to warn the plaintiff-student should not have been dismissed. The fact that the priest was not employed by the school did not require dismissal because the school allegedly released the plaintiff into a dangerous situation. Nor did the fact that the priest allegedly committed criminal acts relieve the school of potential liability.