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AFTER DEFENDANT’S DEFAULT AND FOLLOWING AN INQUEST ON DAMAGES PLAINTIFF WAS AWARDED ABOUT $275,000; THE JUDGE ORDERED PLAINTIFF TO SUBMIT A NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AND A PROPOSED JUDGMENT WITHIN 60 DAYS AS REQUIRED BY 22 NYCRR 202.48; PLANTIFF DID NOT DO SO FOR MORE THAN TWO AND A HALF YEARS; THE ORDER GRANTING THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND THE DECISION ON THE INQUEST WERE VACATED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the order granting a default judgment and the decision awarding nearly $275,000 must be vacated because plaintiff did not submit a notice of settlement and a proposed judgment within 60 days as required by 22 NYCRR 202.48:

Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.48(a), “[p]roposed orders or judgments, with proof of service on all parties where the order is directed to be settled or submitted on notice, must be submitted for signature, unless otherwise directed by the court, within 60 days after the signing and filing of the decision directing that the order be settled or submitted.” “Failure to submit the order or judgment timely shall be deemed an abandonment of the motion or action, unless for good cause shown” (id. § 202.48[b]). Here, it is undisputed that, on January 10, 2017, the plaintiff was directed to settle a judgment on notice. Thus, pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.48(a), the plaintiff was required to submit a notice of settlement and proposed judgment within 60 days after January 10, 2017 … . It is also undisputed that the plaintiff failed to submit a notice of settlement and proposed judgment until July 2, 2019, nearly 2½ years after the Supreme Court directed the plaintiff to settle a judgment on notice. Thus, the plaintiff failed to timely settle a judgment pursuant to the requirements of 22 NYCRR 202.48(a).

… [T]he plaintiff failed to show good cause for his lengthy delay in submitting a notice of settlement and proposed judgment in compliance with the Supreme Court’s directive … . Thus, under the particular circumstances of this case, the court should have granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.48 to vacate the order dated July 23, 2014. … [T]he decision rendered after the inquest must also be vacated. Cruz v Pierce, 2022 NY Slip Op 07054, Second Dept 12-14-22

Practice Point: Here plaintiff was granted a default judgment and, after an inquest of damages, was awarded nearly $275,000. The judge ordered plaintiff to submit a notice of settlement and a proposed judgment within 60 days as required by 22 NYCRR 202.48. Plaintiff failed to do so and the order granting the default judgment and the decision awarding damages were vacated.

 

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