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WRIT OF PROHIBITION PROPER REMEDY FOR TRIAL COURT’S ERRONEOUS EVIDENTIARY RULING, COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN APPLIED TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCE IN THIS CRIMINAL CASE.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gische, determined the trial court should not have applied the collateral estoppel doctrine to preclude the People from introducing evidence the defendant used a firearm to threaten the robbery victim. The grand jury dismissed the robbery first count and indicted on robbery third. The trial court reasoned that the grand jury necessarily found the defendant did not have a weapon by refusing to indict on robbery first. The First Department held: (1) the article 78 proceeding seeking a writ of prohibition (brought by the People against the trial judge) was the appropriate remedy; and (2) the trial judge is prohibited from enforcing the order precluding evidence of the defendant’s possession of a weapon:

A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy, only available to prevent a court from either acting without jurisdiction or in excess of its authorized powers in a proceeding over which it otherwise has jurisdiction … . Prohibition is not available to review mere errors of law, even when the errors are truly egregious … .

“Although the distinction between legal errors and actions made in excess of authority is not always easily made, abuses of power may be identified by their impact on the entire proceeding as distinguished from an error in a proceeding itself” … . The trial court’s ruling in this case was an error that affected the entire proceeding and thus constituted an excess of the court’s authority. The ruling prevents the People from proving the element of force required under third degree robbery because the gun was the only evidence of force that was presented to the grand jury. The People cannot present different facts at trial in support of the indictment … . Although the court did not actually dismiss the third degree robbery charge, the charge cannot withstand a claim of legal insufficiency, because there are no other facts on which the prosecution can rely to prove force, a necessary element of the charge. * * *

A writ of prohibition will lie where a trial court’s erroneous ruling affects the proceeding in a conclusive manner, by terminating the case … . At bar, although the ruling did not actually terminate the case, it effectively terminated the ability of the People to prosecute the highest count in the indictment … . We therefore find that the court’s ruling is reviewable by way of a writ of prohibition. * * *

The Court of Appeals has recognized … that for policy reasons collateral estoppel is not as liberally applied in criminal prosecutions as in civil actions … . The rigid application of collateral estoppel must yield to society’s preeminent and overwhelming interest in ensuring the correctness of determinations of guilt or innocence … . “Thus, if … collateral estoppel ‘cannot practicably be followed if a necessary witness is to give truthful testimony, then [the doctrine] should not be applied'” … . Matter of Clark v Newbauer, 2017 NY Slip Op 01326, 1st Dept 2-21-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (WRIT OF PROHIBITION PROPER REMEDY FOR TRIAL COURT’S ERRONEOUS EVIDENTIARY RULING, COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN APPLIED TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCE IN THIS CRIMINAL CASE)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (WRIT OF PROHIBITION PROPER REMEDY FOR TRIAL COURT’S ERRONEOUS EVIDENTIARY RULING, COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN APPLIED TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCE IN THIS CRIMINAL CASE)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, WRIT OF PROHIBITION PROPER REMEDY FOR TRIAL COURT’S ERRONEOUS EVIDENTIARY RULING, COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN APPLIED TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCE IN THIS CRIMINAL CASE)/JUDGES (CRIMINAL LAW, WRIT OF PROHIBITION PROPER REMEDY FOR TRIAL COURT’S ERRONEOUS EVIDENTIARY RULING, COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN APPLIED TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCE IN THIS CRIMINAL CASE)/PROHIBITION (CRIMINAL LAW, WRIT OF PROHIBITION PROPER REMEDY FOR TRIAL COURT’S ERRONEOUS EVIDENTIARY RULING, COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN APPLIED TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCE IN THIS CRIMINAL CASE)/COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL (CRIMINAL LAW, WRIT OF PROHIBITION PROPER REMEDY FOR TRIAL COURT’S ERRONEOUS EVIDENTIARY RULING, COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN APPLIED TO PRECLUDE EVIDENCE IN THIS CRIMINAL CASE)

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MENTAL HEALTH, HIV, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND ALCOHOL ABUSE MEDICAL RECORDS NOT DISCOVERABLE IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE.

The First Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined the defendants in this personal injury case did not demonstrate a need for plaintiff’s mental health, alcohol abuse, substance abuse and HIV-related medical records. Supreme Court properly issued a protective order to that effect:

Defendants did not meet their burden of showing a “compelling need” for medical records concerning HIV; they failed to submit evidence that would establish a connection between plaintiff’s claimed HIV status and her future enjoyment of life (Public Health Law § 2785[2][a]…). Similarly, defendants failed to meet their burden of showing that “the interests of justice significantly outweigh the need for confidentiality” such to permit discovery of mental health, alcohol abuse, or substance abuse records (Mental Hygiene Law § 33.13[c][1]; Mental Hygiene Law § 22.05 [b] …).

As the dissent notes, as a rule, “all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action” should be fully disclosed (CPLR 3101[a] …). However, plaintiff’s alleged general anxiety and mental anguish from back and leg injuries do not place her entire mental and physical health into contention … . She has not, as argued by the dissent, waived any protection applicable to such records. James v 1620 Westchester Ave. LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 01303, 1st Dept 2-21-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (MENTAL HEALTH, HIV, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND ALCOHOL ABUSE MEDICAL RECORDS NOT DISCOVERABLE IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE)/NEGLIGENCE (CIVIL PROCEDURE, (MENTAL HEALTH, HIV, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND ALCOHOL ABUSE MEDICAL RECORDS NOT DISCOVERABLE IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE)/DISCOVERY (MEDICAL RECORDS, MENTAL HEALTH, HIV, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND ALCOHOL ABUSE MEDICAL RECORDS NOT DISCOVERABLE IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE)/MEDICAL RECORDS (MENTAL HEALTH, HIV, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND ALCOHOL ABUSE MEDICAL RECORDS NOT DISCOVERABLE IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE)/HIV (MEDICAL RECORDS, MENTAL HEALTH, HIV, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND ALCOHOL ABUSE MEDICAL RECORDS NOT DISCOVERABLE IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE)/MENTAL HEALTH (MEDICAL RECORDS, MENTAL HEALTH, HIV, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND ALCOHOL ABUSE MEDICAL RECORDS NOT DISCOVERABLE IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE)/SUBSTANCE ABUSE (MEDICAL RECORDS, MENTAL HEALTH, HIV, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND ALCOHOL ABUSE MEDICAL RECORDS NOT DISCOVERABLE IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE)/ALCOHOL ABUSE (MEDICAL RECORDS, MENTAL HEALTH, HIV, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND ALCOHOL ABUSE MEDICAL RECORDS NOT DISCOVERABLE IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE)/PRIVILEGE (MEDICAL RECORDS, MENTAL HEALTH, HIV, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND ALCOHOL ABUSE MEDICAL RECORDS NOT DISCOVERABLE IN THIS PERSONAL INJURY CASE)

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STRIKING DEFENDANTS’ ANSWERS WAS AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE.

The First Department determined the striking of defendants’ answers was the proper remedy for spoliation of evidence. Plaintiff was injured on a staircase. The staircase was removed and destroyed days before a scheduled inspection:

Plaintiffs’ pre-action service of preservation letters on the daycare, the initiation of this action, and the issuance of the preliminary conference order, placed defendants on notice of the need to preserve the staircase. The staircase was removed and destroyed in November 2013, days before the scheduled court-ordered inspection. As found by the motion court, “[I]t is clear that the individual defendants destroyed the stairs in question in violation of the order of th[e] court, knowing that plaintiff’s inspection was to take place a few days later.”

The intentional destruction of the staircase, key physical evidence, severely prejudices plaintiffs’ ability to prove their case, and warrants the extreme sanction of striking defendants’ answers … . The record contains no evidence that photographs depicting the staircase exist. Nor is this a case where plaintiffs sat on their rights … . Rookwood v Busy B’s Child Care Daycare Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 01281, 1st Dept 2-16-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (SPOLIATION, STRIKING DEFENDANTS’ ANSWERS WAS AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE)/EVIDENCE (SPOLIATION, STRIKING DEFENDANTS’ ANSWERS WAS AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE)/SPOLIATION (STRIKING DEFENDANTS’ ANSWERS WAS AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE)/NEGLIGENCE (EVIDENCE, SPOLIATION, STRIKING DEFENDANTS’ ANSWERS WAS AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE)

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PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW PURSUANT TO CPLR 4401 PROPERLY GRANTED ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION, JURY HAD FOUND THE LABOR LAW 240(1) VIOLATION WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT.

The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly granted plaintiffs’ motion for a judgment as a matter of law (CPLR 4401) on the Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action. Plaintiff fell from the top of a boiler when a co-worker accidentally caused hot water and steam to escape from a valve. The jury found that the Labor Law 240(1) violation was not the proximate cause of the accident:

Here, the evidence adduced at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, demonstrated that the defendant failed to provide an adequate safety device to the plaintiff, and that this failure proximately caused the plaintiff’s fall. The fact that the plaintiff’s coworker bumped into the valves, which caused hot water and steam to pour onto the plaintiff and precipitated his fall, was not of such an extraordinary nature or so attenuated from the defendant’s conduct that responsibility for the injury should not reasonably be attributed to it … . Moreover, in light of the statutory violation, even if the plaintiff were negligent in some respect, his comparative negligence would not bar liability under Labor Law § 240(1) … . Raia v Berkeley Coop. Towers Section II Corp., 2017 NY Slip Op 01243, 2nd Dept 2-15-17

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW PURSUANT TO CPLR 4401 PROPERLY GRANTED ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION, JURY HAD FOUND THE LABOR LAW 240(1) VIOLATION WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT)/PROXIMATE CAUSE (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW PURSUANT TO CPLR 4401 PROPERLY GRANTED ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION, JURY HAD FOUND THE LABOR LAW 240(1) VIOLATION WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT)/JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW (CPLR 4401) (PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW PURSUANT TO CPLR 4401 PROPERLY GRANTED ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION, JURY HAD FOUND THE LABOR LAW 240(1) VIOLATION WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT)

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FAILURE TO RESPOND TO DISCOVERY DEMANDS AND OBEY COURT ORDERS WARRANTED STRIKING DEFENDANTS’ ANSWERS IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a partial dissent, determined defendants’ answers in this medical malpractice action should have been struck because of the failure to turn over the names of defendants’ employees and failure to obey court orders during discovery:

The Supreme Court properly inferred the willful and contumacious character of the defendants’ conduct from their repeated failures over an extended period of time, without an adequate excuse, to comply with the plaintiff’s discovery demands and the court’s discovery orders … . This conduct included: (1) misrepresenting that the surgical booker Marcia Barnaby was no longer employed by the Hospital; (2) failing to disclose Anthony Pastor as a surgical booker; and (3) failing to timely and fully comply with the court’s order to produce an affidavit from Schiff in the form required by the court. “[P]arties, where necessary, will be held responsible for the failure of their lawyers to meet court-ordered deadlines and provide meaningful responses to discovery demands” … . * * *

Here, contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, we find that the imposition of monetary sanctions was insufficient to punish the defendants and their counsel for their willful and contumacious conduct in failing to timely and fully respond to discovery demands and court orders. Lucas v Stam, 2017 NY Slip Op 01190, 2nd Dept 2-15-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (DISCOVERY, FAILURE TO RESPOND TO DISCOVERY DEMANDS AND OBEY COURT ORDERS WARRANTED STRIKING DEFENDANTS’ ANSWERS)/NEGLIGENCE (DISCOVERY, FAILURE TO RESPOND TO DISCOVERY DEMANDS AND OBEY COURT ORDERS WARRANTED STRIKING DEFENDANTS’ ANSWERS)/ATTORNEYS (NEGLIGENCE, DISCOVERY, FAILURE TO RESPOND TO DISCOVERY DEMANDS AND OBEY COURT ORDERS WARRANTED STRIKING DEFENDANTS’ ANSWERS)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (DISCOVERY, FAILURE TO RESPOND TO DISCOVERY DEMANDS AND OBEY COURT ORDERS WARRANTED STRIKING DEFENDANTS’ ANSWERS)/DISCOVERY (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, FAILURE TO RESPOND TO DISCOVERY DEMANDS AND OBEY COURT ORDERS WARRANTED STRIKING DEFENDANTS’ ANSWERS)

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PROTECTIVE ORDER PROHIBITING ANY NON-LAWYER FROM ATTENDING PLAINTIFF’S PHYSICAL EXAMINATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ISSUED.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined a protective order prohibiting any non-attorney from accompanying plaintiff to a physical examination should not have been issued:

A plaintiff “is entitled to be examined in the presence of [his or] her attorney or other legal representative, as well as an interpreter, if necessary, so long as they do not interfere with the conduct of the examination[ ]” … . Here, the defendant failed to meet his burden of establishing that the plaintiffs’ representative would improperly interfere with the conduct of the injured plaintiff’s physical examination … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the defendant’s motion which was for a protective order precluding any non-attorney from accompanying the injured plaintiff in the examination room during his physical examination. Henderson v Ross, 2017 NY Slip Op 01186, 2nd Dept 2-15-17

CIVIL PROCEDURE (PROTECTIVE ORDER PROHIBITING ANY NON-LAWYER FROM ATTENDING PLAINTIFF’S PHYSICAL EXAMINATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ISSUED)/NEGLIGENCE (PHYSICAL EXAMINATION, PROTECTIVE ORDER PROHIBITING ANY NON-LAWYER FROM ATTENDING PLAINTIFF’S PHYSICAL EXAMINATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ISSUED)/PHYSICAL EXAMINATION (NEGLIGENCE, PROTECTIVE ORDER PROHIBITING ANY NON-LAWYER FROM ATTENDING PLAINTIFF’S PHYSICAL EXAMINATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ISSUED)/DISCOVERY (NEGLIGENCE, PROTECTIVE ORDER PROHIBITING ANY NON-LAWYER FROM ATTENDING PLAINTIFF’S PHYSICAL EXAMINATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ISSUED)

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PAYMENT GUARANTEES NOT ENTITLED TO EXPEDITED TREATMENT PURSUANT TO CPLR 3213 AS INSTRUMENTS FOR THE PAYMENT OF MONEY ONLY, REFERENCE TO OTHER DOCUMENTS WAS NEEDED.

The First Department held determination of the meaning of the payment guarantees at issue required reference to other documents. Therefore the guarantees were not entitled to expedited treatment pursuant to CPLR 3213 as instruments for the payment of money only:

“The prototypical example of an instrument within the ambit of [CPLR 3213] is of course a negotiable instrument for the payment of money—an unconditional promise to pay a sum certain, signed by the maker and due on demand or at a definite time” … . CPLR 3213 is generally used to enforce “some variety of commercial paper in which the party to be charged has formally and explicitly acknowledged an indebtedness,” so that “a prima facie case would be made out by the instrument and a failure to make the payments called for by its terms” … . A document does not qualify for CPLR 3213 treatment if the court must consult other materials besides the bare document and proof of nonpayment, or if it must make a more than de minimis deviation from the face of the document … . PDL Biopharma, Inc. v Wohlstadter, 2017 NY Slip Op 01151, 1st Dept 2-14-17

CIVIL PROCEDURE (PAYMENT GUARANTEES NOT ENTITLED TO EXPEDITED TREATMENT PURSUANT TO CPLR 3213 AS INSTRUMENTS FOR THE PAYMENT OF MONEY ONLY, REFERENCE TO OTHER DOCUMENTS WAS NEEDED)/DEBTOR-CREDITOR (PAYMENT GUARANTEES NOT ENTITLED TO EXPEDITED TREATMENT PURSUANT TO CPLR 3213 AS INSTRUMENTS FOR THE PAYMENT OF MONEY ONLY, REFERENCE TO OTHER DOCUMENTS WAS NEEDED)/GUARANTEES (CPLR 3213, PAYMENT GUARANTEES NOT ENTITLED TO EXPEDITED TREATMENT PURSUANT TO CPLR 3213 AS INSTRUMENTS FOR THE PAYMENT OF MONEY ONLY, REFERENCE TO OTHER DOCUMENTS WAS NEEDED)/INSTRUMENTS FOR THE PAYMENT OF MONEY ONLY (PAYMENT GUARANTEES NOT ENTITLED TO EXPEDITED TREATMENT PURSUANT TO CPLR 3213 AS INSTRUMENTS FOR THE PAYMENT OF MONEY ONLY, REFERENCE TO OTHER DOCUMENTS WAS NEEDED)/CPLR 3213 (PAYMENT GUARANTEES NOT ENTITLED TO EXPEDITED TREATMENT PURSUANT TO CPLR 3213 AS INSTRUMENTS FOR THE PAYMENT OF MONEY ONLY, REFERENCE TO OTHER DOCUMENTS WAS NEEDED)

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CPLR 1601 DOES NOT ALLOW DAMAGES TO BE APPORTIONED AGAINST THE NON-PARTY STATE IN A NEGLIGENCE ACTION IN SUPREME COURT.

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, over a two-judge dissent, determined damages could not be apportioned against the (non-party) state in a negligence action in Supreme Court. The plaintiffs alleged a tree branch fell on plaintiffs’ car as plaintiffs were driving on a public street. The plaintiffs sued the property owner, but also filed a claim against the state alleging the state was negligent. The state can only be sued in the Court of Claims. Although, by statute (CPLR 1601], damages can be apportioned against a non-party defendant in the Court of Claims, the Court of Appeals held the statute does not allow damages to be apportioned against the non-party state in Supreme Court:

The statutory language permitting the State to seek apportionment in the Court of Claims against a private defendant if the claimant could have sued that defendant in any court of this State was specifically requested by the office of the Attorney General … . Pursuant to that language, as long as a claimant in the Court of Claims could have commenced an action against a private tortfeasor in any court in the State of New York, then the tortfeasor’s culpable conduct can be considered by the Court of Claims in determining the State’s equitable share of the total liability … . The statute does not, however, contain similar, express enabling language to allow apportionment against the state in a Supreme Court action … .

Plaintiffs, along with the State, argue that the inclusion of unambiguous language permitting the Court of Claims to consider the liability of a nonparty tortfeasor — while, at the same time, omitting language to allow the factfinder in Supreme Court to consider the liability of the State — demonstrates the Legislature’s intent not to allow apportionment of the State’s liability in Supreme Court. Moreover, even apart from the absence of language permitting apportionment against the State in Supreme Court, CPLR 1601 (1) provides that a nonparty tortfeasor’s relative culpability must not be considered in apportioning fault “if the claimant . . . with due diligence . . . was unable to obtain jurisdiction over such person in said action” … . Artibee v Home Place Corp., 2017 NY Slip Op 01145, CtApp 2-14-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (NEGLIGENCE, CPLR 1601 DOES NOT ALLOW DAMAGES TO BE APPORTIONED AGAINST THE NON-PARTY STATE IN A NEGLIGENCE ACTION IN SUPREME COURT)/NEGLIGENCE (DAMAGES,  CPLR 1601 DOES NOT ALLOW DAMAGES TO BE APPORTIONED AGAINST THE NON-PARTY STATE IN A NEGLIGENCE ACTION IN SUPREME COURT)/DAMAGES (NEGLIGENCE, CPLR 1601 DOES NOT ALLOW DAMAGES TO BE APPORTIONED AGAINST THE NON-PARTY STATE IN A NEGLIGENCE ACTION IN SUPREME COURT)/IMMUNITY (NEGLIGENCE, CPLR 1601 DOES NOT ALLOW DAMAGES TO BE APPORTIONED AGAINST THE NON-PARTY STATE IN A NEGLIGENCE ACTION IN SUPREME COURT)

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CPLR 205 (a), WHICH ALLOWS SIX MONTHS FOR RECOMMENCING AN ACTION AFTER DISMISSAL, APPLIES TO FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS, EVEN WHEN THE CURRENT HOLDER OF THE NOTE IS A SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO THE PARTY WHICH STARTED THE FORECLOSURE ACTION.

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Maltese, determined the six-month extension of a statute of limitations provided by CPLR 205 (a) applied in this foreclosure action. The court summarized the rulings as follows:

Under certain conditions, CPLR 205(a) provides an additional six months in which to recommence a prior action that has been dismissed on grounds other than voluntary discontinuance, lack of personal jurisdiction, neglect to prosecute, or a final judgment on the merits. The first question in this case is whether a prior action to foreclose the same mortgage was dismissed for neglect to prosecute, a category of dismissal that renders CPLR 205(a) inapplicable. We answer this question in the negative, concluding that the prior action was not dismissed for neglect to prosecute.

The second question is more novel. We must determine whether the plaintiff in this mortgage foreclosure action, which was assigned the note and mortgage during the pendency of the prior foreclosure action, is entitled to the savings provision—or grace period—of CPLR 205(a) even though the prior action was commenced by a prior holder of the note. … [W]e conclude that a plaintiff in a mortgage foreclosure action which meets all of the other requirements of the statute is entitled to the benefit of CPLR 205(a) where, as here, it is the successor in interest as the current holder of the note. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Eitani, 2017 NY Slip Op 01015, 2nd Dept 2-8-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (CPLR 205 (a), WHICH ALLOWS SIX MONTHS FOR RECOMMENCING AN ACTION AFTER DISMISSAL, APPLIES TO FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS, EVEN WHEN THE CURRENT HOLDER OF THE NOTE IS A SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO THE PARTY WHICH STARTED THE FORECLOSURE ACTION)/FORECLOSURE (CPLR 205 (a), WHICH ALLOWS SIX MONTHS FOR RECOMMENCING AN ACTION AFTER DISMISSAL, APPLIES TO FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS, EVEN WHEN THE CURRENT HOLDER OF THE NOTE IS A SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO THE PARTY WHICH STARTED THE FORECLOSURE ACTION)

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TRANSFER OF LAND TO A TRUST PURSUANT TO THE ONEIDA SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT DID NOT CEDE THE STATE’S TAXATION AUTHORITY; MOTION TO DISMISS A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION WILL BE TREATED AS A MOTION FOR A DECLARATION IN DEFENDANT’S FAVOR.

The Fourth Department determined a citizen taxpayer’s declaratory judgment action against the state, claiming that the transfer of land to a trust pursuant to the Oneida Settlement Agreement ceded the state’s taxation authority, was properly rejected. The court noted that when a motion to dismiss a declaratory judgment action is made, the court will treat it as a motion for a declaration in the defendant’s favor:

Plaintiff alleges that Section VI B (1-5) of the Agreement violates article XVI of the State Constitution, which prohibits the State from surrendering, suspending or contracting away its power of taxation. Section VI B (1-5) provides that the State will not oppose a future application by the Oneida Indian Nation (Nation) to transfer to the United States up to 12,366 acres of land to be held in trust pursuant to 25 USC § 5108 (formerly § 465). The land at issue was formerly part of the 300,000-acre reservation, which was established in the 1788 Treaty of Fort Schuyler (see City of Sherrill, N.Y. v Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 US 197, 203), and which the Nation has reacquired through open-market transactions (see id. at 211). In 2008, the United States Secretary of the Interior accepted the transfer into trust of 13,004 acres of reacquired land owned by the Nation, over defendant’s objection. We conclude that the court properly declared that Section VI B (1-5) does not violate the State constitutional provision prohibiting defendant from surrendering or contracting away its power of taxation. * * *

To the extent that plaintiff contends that Executive Law § 11 and Indian Law § 16 violate article XVI of the State Constitution, we reject that contention. Kaplan v State of New York. 2017 NY Slip Op 00766, 4th Dept 2-3-17

 

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (STATE) (TRANSFER OF LAND TO A TRUST PURSUANT TO THE ONEIDA SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT DID NOT CEDE THE STATE’S TAXATION AUTHORITY, MOTION TO DISMISS A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION WILL BE TREATED AS A MOTION FOR A DECLARATION IN DEFENDANT’S FAVOR)/INDIAN LAW (TRANSFER OF LAND TO A TRUST PURSUANT TO THE ONEIDA SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT DID NOT CEDE THE STATE’S TAXATION AUTHORITY, MOTION TO DISMISS A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION WILL BE TREATED AS A MOTION FOR A DECLARATION IN DEFENDANT’S FAVOR)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, (TRANSFER OF LAND TO A TRUST PURSUANT TO THE ONEIDA SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT DID NOT CEDE THE STATE’S TAXATION AUTHORITY, MOTION TO DISMISS A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION WILL BE TREATED AS A MOTION FOR A DECLARATION IN DEFENDANT’S FAVOR)/DECLARATORY JUDGMENT (TRANSFER OF LAND TO A TRUST PURSUANT TO THE ONEIDA SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT DID NOT CEDE THE STATE’S TAXATION AUTHORITY, MOTION TO DISMISS A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION WILL BE TREATED AS A MOTION FOR A DECLARATION IN DEFENDANT’S FAVOR)

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