Civil Procedure – Page 283 – New York Appellate Digest

Civil Procedure, Medical Malpractice, Negligence

PLAINTIFF NEED NOT ELIMINATE ALL OTHER POSSIBLE CAUSES OF INJURY TO MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Peters, determined certain causes of action in this medical malpractice suit should have been allowed to go to the jury. Defendant’s motion for a directed verdict should not have been granted. Most of the opinion is fact-generated and cannot be summarized here. The law surrounding a directed verdict in this context, including the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, was explained. A plaintiff is not required to eliminate all other possible causes of injury to make out a prima facie case:

A directed verdict is only appropriate “when, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving part[y] and affording such part[y] the benefit of every inference, there is no rational process by which a jury could find in favor of the nonmovant[]” … . “[A] plaintiff asserting a medical malpractice claim must demonstrate that the doctor deviated from acceptable medical practice, and that such deviation was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury” … . “[T]o establish proximate causation, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s deviation from the standard of care was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury” … . A plaintiff in a medical malpractice action may also rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur … , which “permits the jury to infer negligence and causation sufficient to establish a prima facie case based on circumstantial evidence” … . “Notably, a plaintiff is not required to eliminate all other possible causes of the injury in order to establish a prima facie case” of medical malpractice … . * * *

“Whether or not res ipsa loquitur was applicable here, plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of negligence to go to the jury” on two of her three theories of liability … . Upon the evidence submitted, Supreme Court properly rejected plaintiff’s first theory of liability as a matter of law at the close of plaintiff’s proof, yet provided no explanation for dismissing the entire complaint, and we can perceive none under the circumstances of this case given the existence of two viable and independent theories of liability that were supported by sufficient trial proof … . Majid v Cheon-Lee, 2016 NY Slip Op 08572, 3rd Dept 12-22-16

NEGLIGENCE (PLAINTIFF NEED NOT ELIMINATE ALL OTHER POSSIBLE CAUSES OF INJURY TO MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (PLAINTIFF NEED NOT ELIMINATE ALL OTHER POSSIBLE CAUSES OF INJURY TO MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (DIRECTED VERDICT, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PLAINTIFF NEED NOT ELIMINATE ALL OTHER POSSIBLE CAUSES OF INJURY TO MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/DIRECTED VERDICT (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, PLAINTIFF NEED NOT ELIMINATE ALL OTHER POSSIBLE CAUSES OF INJURY TO MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

December 22, 2016

Civil Procedure, Civil Rights Law, Municipal Law

FALSE ARREST AND 42 USC 1983 CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, ARREST STEMMING FROM A WARRANT WAS PRIVILEGED.

The Second Department determined the city’s motion to dismiss the complaint as a matter of law, made at the close of plaintiff’s proof, should have been granted. Plaintiff was stopped by the police for urinating in public. Based on an outstanding warrant for plaintiff’s arrest, plaintiff was arrested and detained. After dismissal of the charges, plaintiff sued alleging false arrest and civil rights violations (42 USC 1983). Because plaintiff’s arrest was pursuant to a warrant, the arrest was privileged and could not form the basis of the false arrest and 42 USC 1983 causes of action:

To be awarded judgment as a matter of law pursuant to CPLR 4401, a defendant must show that, upon viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there is no rational basis by which the jury could find for the plaintiff against the moving defendant … . The plaintiff’s evidence must be accepted as true, and the plaintiff is entitled to every favorable inference that can be reasonably drawn therefrom … .

Where the confinement or detention of an individual against his or her will is privileged, a cause of action alleging false arrest will not lie … . One instance in which the privilege applies is when the confinement is based on a facially valid arrest warrant, issued by a court having jurisdiction … .

Here, the plaintiff did not contest the fact that the warrant was facially valid, and was issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. Ali v City of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 08490, Second Dept 12-22-16

MUNICIPAL LAW (FALSE ARREST AND 42 USC 1983 CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, ARREST STEMMING FROM A WARRANT WAS PRIVILEGED)/CIVIL RIGHTS (FALSE ARREST AND 42 USC 1983 CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, ARREST STEMMING FROM A WARRANT WAS PRIVILEGED)/FALSE ARREST (FALSE ARREST AND 42 USC 1983 CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, ARREST STEMMING FROM A WARRANT WAS PRIVILEGED)/42 USC 1983 (FALSE ARREST AND 42 USC 1983 CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, ARREST STEMMING FROM A WARRANT WAS PRIVILEGED)

December 22, 2016

Civil Procedure, Foreclosure

COURTS OF EQUITY HAVE BROAD POWERS TO ACT IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, FORECLOSURE IS EQUITABLE IN NATURE, MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that defendant’s motion to vacate a default judgment in this foreclosure action should have been granted in the interest of justice. The court explained the “interest of justice” powers in this context:

“In addition to the grounds set forth in section 5015(a), a court may vacate its own judgment for sufficient reason and in the interests of substantial justice” … . Moreover, “[a] foreclosure action is equitable in nature and triggers the equitable powers of the court … . “Once equity is invoked, the court’s power is as broad as equity and justice require” … . Thus, a court may rely on “its inherent authority to vacate [a judgment] in the interest of substantial justice, rather than its statutory authority under CPLR 5015(a),” as the “statutory grounds are subsumed by the court’s broader inherent authority” … . U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v Losner, 2016 NY Slip Op 08560, 2nd Dept 12-21-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (COURTS OF EQUITY HAVE BROAD POWERS TO ACT IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, FORECLOSURE IS EQUITABLE IN NATURE, MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/FORECLOSURE (COURTS OF EQUITY HAVE BROAD POWERS TO ACT IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, FORECLOSURE IS EQUITABLE IN NATURE, MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/EQUITY (COURTS OF EQUITY HAVE BROAD POWERS TO ACT IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, FORECLOSURE IS EQUITABLE IN NATURE, MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/DEFAULT, MOTION TO VACATE (FORECLOSURE, COURTS OF EQUITY HAVE BROAD POWERS TO ACT IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, FORECLOSURE IS EQUITABLE IN NATURE, MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

December 21, 2016

Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law

REQUIRING AN OUT OF STATE RESIDENT TO POST SECURITY FOR COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH BRINGING A LAWSUIT IN NEW YORK DOES NOT VIOLATE THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE OF THE US CONSTITUTION.

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Dickerson, determined requiring an out-of-state resident to post security for costs associated with a lawsuit brought in New York does not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the US Constitution. The plaintiff was injured in an accident in New York (when she was a New York resident) and subsequently moved to Georgia. The defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 8501 and 8503 to direct plaintiff to post security for costs in the amount of $500:

… [T]he U.S. Supreme Court has stated that the Privileges and Immunities Clause is satisfied so long as a nonresident ” is given access to the courts of the State upon terms which in themselves are reasonable and adequate for the enforcing of any rights he [or she] may have'” … . … There is a substantial reason for the difference in treatment between nonresidents and residents, namely, the fact that nonresident plaintiffs are unlikely to have assets in New York that may be used to enforce a costs judgment. And the discrimination practiced against nonresidents—requiring nonresident plaintiffs to post security for costs—bears a substantial relationship to the State’s objective of deterring frivolous or harassing lawsuits and preventing a defendant from having to resort to a foreign jurisdiction to enforce a costs judgment … . Clement v Durban, 2016 NY Slip Op 08500, 2nd Dept 12-21-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (REQUIRING AN OUT OF STATE RESIDENT TO POST SECURITY FOR COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH BRINGING A LAWSUIT IN NEW YORK DOES NOT VIOLATE THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE OF THE US CONSTITUTION)/COSTS (CIVIL PROCEDURE, REQUIRING AN OUT OF STATE RESIDENT TO POST SECURITY FOR COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH BRINGING A LAWSUIT IN NEW YORK DOES NOT VIOLATE THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE OF THE US CONSTITUTION)/SECURITY (COSTS CIVIL PROCEDURE, REQUIRING AN OUT OF STATE RESIDENT TO POST SECURITY FOR COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH BRINGING A LAWSUIT IN NEW YORK DOES NOT VIOLATE THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE OF THE US CONSTITUTION)/CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (REQUIRING AN OUT OF STATE RESIDENT TO POST SECURITY FOR COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH BRINGING A LAWSUIT IN NEW YORK DOES NOT VIOLATE THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE OF THE US CONSTITUTION)/PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE (REQUIRING AN OUT OF STATE RESIDENT TO POST SECURITY FOR COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH BRINGING A LAWSUIT IN NEW YORK DOES NOT VIOLATE THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE OF THE US CONSTITUTION)

December 21, 2016

Civil Procedure, Negligence

INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT VERDICT PROPERLY SET ASIDE.

The Second Department determined Supreme Court correctly set aside a verdict in a slip and fall case as inconsistent. The jury found plaintiff was negligent but her negligence was not a substantial factor in causing her injuries (she slipped and fell on a wet floor in defendant’s store). But the jury went on to attribute 15% of the fault for the accident to plaintiff:

… [W]hen a jury’s verdict is internally inconsistent, the trial court must order either reconsideration by the jury or a new trial … . Under the circumstances here, the jury’s verdict as to liability was internally inconsistent because the jury attributed 15% of the fault for the accident to the plaintiff, despite having found that the plaintiff’s negligence was not a substantial factor in causing her injuries … . The Supreme Court properly determined that the jury was confused about the meaning of the court’s charge regarding proximate cause when it returned its liability verdict … . Magee v Cumberland Farms, Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 08354, 2nd Dept 12-14-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT VERDICT PROPERLY SET ASIDE)/VERDICT, MOTION TO SET ASIDE (INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT VERDICT PROPERLY SET ASSIDE)/NEGLIGENCE (SLIP AND FALL, INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT VERDICT PROPERLY SET ASIDE)/SLIP AND FALL (INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT VERDICT PROPERLY SET ASIDE)

December 14, 2016

Civil Procedure, Fiduciary Duty, Fraud

PLEADING REQUIREMENTS FOR A LAUNDRY LIST OF FRAUD-RELATED CAUSES OF ACTION SUCCINCTLY ILLUSTRATED.

The Second Department, in the context of motions to dismiss, motions for injunctions, and motions for sanctions, described the pleading requirements for the following causes of action: preliminary injunction, permanent injunction, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, aiding and abetting fraud, constructive trust, conspiracy to commit a tort, fraudulent conveyance, unjust enrichment and conversion. Swartz v Swartz, 2016 NY Slip Op 08390, 2nd Dept 12-14-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (PLEADING REQUIREMENTS FOR A LAUNDRY LIST OF FRAUD-RELATED CAUSES OF ACTION SUCCINCTLY ILLUSTRATED)/FRAUD PLEADING REQUIREMENTS FOR A LAUNDRY LIST OF FRAUD-RELATED CAUSES OF ACTION SUCCINCTLY ILLUSTRATED)

December 14, 2016

Civil Procedure, Criminal Law, Fraud, Securities

SIX YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES TO FRAUD ACTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANT BANK RELATING TO THE SALE OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES BROUGHT PURSUANT TO THE MARTIN ACT AND EXECUTIVE LAW 63.

The First Department, over an extensive dissent, determined that fraud-related actions against defendant Credit Suisse (stemming from the sale of residential mortgage-backed securities [RMBS]) were governed by the six-year, not three-year statute of limitations. The actions were brought pursuant to the Martin Act and Executive Law 63(12). Those statutes were deemed to have codified common law causes of action. Therefore the six-year statute (CPLR 213), not the three-year statute (CPLR 214) applies:

Where claims are “to recover upon a liability . . . created or imposed by statute” (CPLR 214[2]), and the liability, although akin to common-law causes, “would not exist but for [the] statute” … , the three-year statute of limitations of CPLR 214(2) applies … . In contrast, where a statute “merely codifies and affords new remedies for what in essence is a common-law … claim[,]” CPLR 214(2) does not apply and “the Statute of Limitations for the statutory claim is that for the common-law cause of action which the statute codified or implemented”(id. at 208).

In the complaint, the Attorney General alleges, inter alia, that defendants’ fraud was their failure to abide by their representations that they had carefully evaluated and would continue to monitor the quality of the loans underlying their RMBS, and that they would encourage loan originators to implement sound origination practices. Instead, defendants routinely ignored defects discovered in their due diligence reviews and did not seek to influence originators to utilize appropriate origination practices, choosing instead to misuse their quality control process to obtain significant monetary settlements from originators, which defendants improperly kept for themselves. People v Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 2016 NY Slip Op 08339, 1st Dept 12-13-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (SIX YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES TO FRAUD ACTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANT BANK RELATING TO THE SALE OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES BROUGHT PURSUANT TO THE MARTIN ACT AND EXECUTIVE LAW 63)/SECURITIES (SIX YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES TO FRAUD ACTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANT BANK RELATING TO THE SALE OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES BROUGHT PURSUANT TO THE MARTIN ACT AND EXECUTIVE LAW 63)/FRAUD (SIX YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES TO FRAUD ACTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANT BANK RELATING TO THE SALE OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES BROUGHT PURSUANT TO THE MARTIN ACT AND EXECUTIVE LAW 63)/CRIMINAL LAW (SECURITIES FRAUD, SIX YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES TO FRAUD ACTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANT BANK RELATING TO THE SALE OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES BROUGHT PURSUANT TO THE MARTIN ACT AND EXECUTIVE LAW 63)/EXECUTIVE LAW 63 (SIX YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES TO FRAUD ACTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANT BANK RELATING TO THE SALE OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES BROUGHT PURSUANT TO THE MARTIN ACT AND EXECUTIVE LAW 63)/MARTIN ACT (SIX YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES TO FRAUD ACTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANT BANK RELATING TO THE SALE OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES BROUGHT PURSUANT TO THE MARTIN ACT AND EXECUTIVE LAW 63)/STATUTE OF LIMITATION (SIX YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES TO FRAUD ACTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANT BANK RELATING TO THE SALE OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES BROUGHT PURSUANT TO THE MARTIN ACT AND EXECUTIVE LAW 63),RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES (SIX YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES TO FRAUD ACTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANT BANK RELATING TO THE SALE OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES BROUGHT PURSUANT TO THE MARTIN ACT AND EXECUTIVE LAW 63)

December 13, 2016

Civil Procedure

REDACTED DOCUMENTS AND A SEALED RECORD MUST BE UNREDACTED AND UNSEALED, CRITERIA AND PROCEDURE FOR REDACTION AND SEALING EXPLAINED.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined redacted documents filed in connection with one lawsuit, and the entirely sealed record of a second lawsuit should be fully disclosed and available to the media (the intervenors here):

This Court has previously held that there is a “broad presumption that the public is entitled to access to judicial proceedings and court records” … . The right of public access includes the right of the press to read and review court documents, unless those documents have been sealed pursuant to a statutory provision or by a properly issued sealing order. To allow them to assert their interests here, the proposed intervenors should be allowed to intervene in both actions for the limited purpose of obtaining access to court records … .

Furthermore, because confidentiality is the exception and not the rule … , “the party seeking to seal court records has the burden to demonstrate compelling circumstances to justify restricting public access” … . Having reviewed the record, we see no basis to seal the entire court record in the second action; therefore, we vacate the sealing order. It appears that the motion court sealed the second action because the parties stipulated to it. Before sealing, the motion court should have made its own written finding of good cause, as is required by the provisions of the Uniform Rules for Trial Courts (22 NYCRR) § 216.1(a) … . Maxim Inc. v Feifer, 2016 NY Slip Op 08319, 1st Dept 12-13-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (REDACTED DOCUMENTS AND A SEALED RECORD MUST BE UNREDACTED AND UNSEALED, CRITERIA AND PROCEDURE FOR REDACTION AND SEALING EXPLAINED)/SEALING-REDACTION OF COURT RECORDS (CIVIL, REDACTED DOCUMENTS AND A SEALED RECORD MUST BE UNREDACTED AND UNSEALED, CRITERIA AND PROCEDURE FOR REDACTION AND SEALING EXPLAINED)

December 13, 2016

Civil Procedure, Real Property Tax Law

DEPOSITION OF TOWN ASSESSOR PROPERLY ALLOWED IN THIS SELECTIVE REASSESSMENT PROCEEDING.

The Third Department, affirming Supreme Court, determined the deposition of the town tax assessor was properly allowed in this proceeding challenging a tax assessment of a golf course as “selective reassessment:”

“A property owner may challenge an assessment pursuant to RPTL article 7 on several grounds, including that the assessment is excessive, unequal or unlawful” … . Furthermore, “[i]t is well settled that a system of selective reassessment that has no rational basis in law violates the equal protection provisions of the constitutions of the United States and the State of New York” … .

“[D]iscovery in a RPTL article 7 proceeding is governed by CPLR 408, pursuant to which trial courts have broad discretion in directing the disclosure of material and necessary information” … . The trial court’s decision to compel discovery is accorded deference on appeal and should not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion as a matter of law … . Additionally, to obtain discovery, a party must submit an affirmation showing “a good faith effort to resolve the issues raised by the [discovery] motion” or indicating “good cause” why no communications occurred between the parties in this regard (22 NYCRR 202.7 [a] [2]; [c]…). Matter of City of Troy v Assessor of The Town of Brunswick, 2016 NY Slip Op 08280, 3rd Dept 12-8-16

REAL PROPERTY TAX LAW (DEPOSITION OF TOWN ASSESSOR PROPERLY ALLOWED IN THIS SELECTIVE REASSESSMENT PROCEEDING)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (REAL PROPERTY TAX LAW, DEPOSITION OF TOWN ASSESSOR PROPERLY ALLOWED IN THIS SELECTIVE REASSESSMENT PROCEEDING)

December 8, 2016

Civil Procedure, Criminal Law, Evidence

STATEMENT BY UNIDENTIFIED BYSTANDER, AUDIBLE ON THE 911 CALL, ADMISSIBLE, EVIDENTIARY RULINGS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE.

The First Department determined that a statement by an unidentified bystander, audible on the 911 call, was properly admitted as an excited utterance. The court noted that another judge, who became ill, had ruled the statement inadmissible. Because it was an evidentiary ruling, it was not subject to the law of the case doctrine:

The court providently admitted, as an excited utterance, the statement of an unidentified bystander, audible on the 911 call made by one of the victims, that implicated defendant. All of the circumstances — most significantly that the statement was made immediately after the shooting — established a strong likelihood that the declarant observed the shooting … .

Although a contrary ruling on the excited utterance issue had been made by a previous judge, who presided over part of jury selection but was unable to continue because of illness, this circumstance did not foreclose the successor judge’s ruling by operation of the law of the case doctrine. The ruling was evidentiary and did not fall within the ambit of that doctrine (see People v Evans , 94 NY2d 499 [2000]). Defendant does not dispute that this was the type of ruling that, under Evans , may be revisited by a successor judge in a retrial. We see no reason to apply a different rule where there are successive judges in the same trial … . People v Cummings, 2016 NY Slip Op 08298, 1st Dept 12-8-16

CRIMINAL LAW (STATEMENT BY UNIDENTIFIED BYSTANDER, AUDIBLE ON THE 911 CALL, ADMISSIBLE, EVIDENTIARY RULINGS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, STATEMENT BY UNIDENTIFIED BYSTANDER, AUDIBLE ON THE 911 CALL, ADMISSIBLE, EVIDENTIARY RULINGS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE)/EXCITED UTTERANCE (STATEMENT BY UNIDENTIFIED BYSTANDER, AUDIBLE ON THE 911 CALL, ADMISSIBLE, EVIDENTIARY RULINGS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE)/HEARSAY (EXCITED UTTERANCE, STATEMENT BY UNIDENTIFIED BYSTANDER, AUDIBLE ON THE 911 CALL, ADMISSIBLE, EVIDENTIARY RULINGS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE)/LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE (CRIMINAL LAW, STATEMENT BY UNIDENTIFIED BYSTANDER, AUDIBLE ON THE 911 CALL, ADMISSIBLE, EVIDENTIARY RULINGS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (CRIMINAL LAW, STATEMENT BY UNIDENTIFIED BYSTANDER, AUDIBLE ON THE 911 CALL, ADMISSIBLE, EVIDENTIARY RULINGS ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE)