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RECORDS OF PLAINTIFF’S STAY AT A SHELTER FOR VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ARE DISCOVERABLE IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION AS DEEMED APPROPRIATE BY THE TRIAL COURT UPON REVIEW, DEFENDANTS ENTITLED TO PRIVILEGE LOG.

The Fourth Department determined the records of plaintiff’s stay at a shelter for domestic violence victims were not protected by privilege. The defendants in this medical malpractice action sought the records and the plaintiff’s privilege log. The medical malpractice action stemmed from treatment of injuries from an assault. The Fourth Department held that the defendants were entitled to the privilege log, which plaintiff the trial court had ordered submitted only to the court. After the defendants review the log the trial court should hear argument from the defendants concerning the discoverability of any identified documents:

… [T]he shelter records are not protected by any privilege, and they are thus subject to disclosure to the extent that they are material and necessary to the defense of the action … . Even assuming, arguendo, that the records were prepared by licensed social workers, which is not evident from the records themselves, we conclude that plaintiff waived any privilege afforded by CPLR 4508 by affirmatively placing her medical and psychological condition in controversy through the broad allegations of injury in her bills of particulars … . Inasmuch as defendants are not seeking disclosure of the street address of the shelter, we reject plaintiff’s contention that Social Services Law § 459-h precludes disclosure of the records. Furthermore, 18 NYCRR 452.10 (a), which renders confidential certain information “relating to the operation of residential programs for victims of domestic violence and to the residents of such programs,” does not preclude disclosure of the records because that regulation allows for access to such information “as permitted by an order of a court of competent jurisdiction” … . That regulation does not preclude a court from ordering disclosure of shelter records that are material and necessary to the defense of an action … .

… [W]e conclude that defendants are not entitled to ” unfettered disclosure’ ” of plaintiff’s potentially sensitive shelter records … . Indeed, we note that a court is “entitled to consider . . . the personal nature of the information sought” in making a disclosure order … . We agree with defendants, however, that the court should have directed plaintiff to provide a copy of her privilege log to them rather than directing her to provide it only to the court as an aid for its in camera review of the records. Abraha v Adams, 2017 NY Slip Op 02526, 4th Dept 3-31-17

 

DEFENDANTS’ DEMAND FOR A CHANGE OF VENUE WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED AS UNTIMELY UNDER THE ELECTRONIC FILING RULES (TO WHICH DEFENDANTS HAD CONSENTED).

The First Department determined defendants demand for a change of venue was untimely under the electronic filing rules, to which defendants had consented:

Supreme Court properly concluded that defendants’ motion was untimely. Having consented to electronic filing, defendants were required to serve their papers electronically (Uniform Rules for Trial Cts [22 NYCRR] § 202.5-b[d][1]), and indeed served their demand for change of venue, together with their answer, by e-filing the documents on July 14, 2015 … . Having served their demand, defendants were required to bring their motion to change venue within 15 days, or by July 29, 2015 (CPLR 511). However, defendants did not bring their motion until July 31, 2015, rendering it untimely. That defendants also elected to serve their demand via United States mail did not extend the deadline for their motion under CPLR 2103(b)(2). Because they consented to participate in Supreme Court’s e-filing system, defendants were bound by the applicable rules governing service. Woodward v Millbrook Ventures LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 02522, 1st Dept 3-30-17

 

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DISMISSAL OF INTENTIONAL TORT CAUSES OF ACTION PRECLUDED SUBSEQUENT ACTION SOUNDING IN NEGLIGENCE, NO NEGLIGENT ASSAULT IN NEW YORK.

The Second Department noted that New York does not recognize an action for negligent assault. Plaintiff’s intentional tort causes stemming from an arrest by a security guard were dismissed as time-barred. Plaintiff then brought suit under a negligence theory:

“[U]nder New York’s transactional analysis approach to res judicata, once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy'” … . Here, the purported negligence cause of action asserted in the plaintiff’s second action arose from the same operative facts as the dismissed intentional tort claims, and could have been raised in the first action. Accordingly, in view of the previous litigation between the parties, the Supreme Court properly directed the dismissal of that cause of action on the ground that it was barred by the doctrine of res judicata … .

Furthermore, the Supreme Court properly dismissed the negligence cause of action on the additional ground that the allegations in support of it failed to state a cause of action. The allegations that Doe physically injured the plaintiff while restraining and arresting him did not transform the plaintiff’s time-barred cause of action alleging assault into a timely cause of action alleging negligence, as New York does not recognize a cause of action to recover for negligent assault … . Johnson v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 02410, 2nd Dept 3-29-17

 

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PLAINTIFFS HAD STANDING TO SUE FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE STEMMING FROM A TRIAL BROUGHT IN THE NAME OF PLAINTIFFS’ CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a dissent, determined the plaintiffs, who were discharged in Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings, could sue for legal malpractice stemming from a personal injury trial brought in the name of the bankruptcy trustee. The plaintiffs alleged the recovery in the personal injury trial was diminished because the jury became aware an injury report had been altered by the defedant lawyers and a doctor:

… [W]e find that the plaintiffs, as Chapter 13 debtors, had standing to maintain this action. We note that standing, of course, concerns the absence or presence of a sufficiently cognizable stake in the outcome of the litigation … .

In contrast to Chapter 7 proceedings, the object of a Chapter 13 proceeding is the rehabilitation of the debtor under a plan that adjusts debts owed to creditors by the debtor’s regular periodic payments derived principally from income. Thus, in a Chapter 13 proceeding, a debtor generally retains his property, if he so proposes, and seeks court confirmation of a plan to repay his debts over a three- to five-year period … . Payments under a Chapter 13 plan are usually made from a debtor’s “future earnings or other future income” … . “Accordingly, the Chapter 13 estate from which creditors may be paid includes both the debtor’s property at the time of his bankruptcy petition, and any wages and property acquired after filing” … . Assets acquired after a Chapter 13 plan is confirmed by the court are not included as property of the estate, unless they are necessary to maintain the plan … , or the trustee seeks a modification of the plan to remedy a substantial change in the debtor’s income or expenses that was not anticipated at the time of the confirmation hearing … . Unlike Chapter 7 proceedings, there is no separation of the estate property from the debtor under a Chapter 13 proceeding, except to the extent that the plan, as confirmed by order of the court, places control over an asset in the hands of the trustee … . This is the basis for the conclusion that, while Chapters 7 and 11 debtors lose capacity to maintain civil suits, Chapter 13 debtors do not … . Thus, a Chapter 13 debtor keeps all, or at the very least some, of the income and property he or she acquires during the administration of the repayment plan. Accordingly, in this action, it was never the bankruptcy estate, or its creditors, that was damaged by a decrease in the amount awarded in the underlying personal injury action due to the alleged conduct of the defendants. Only the plaintiffs had an interest in the recovery of damages in the personal injury action … . Moreover, it was the plaintiffs and the defendants who were engaged in a face-to-face relationship in the underlying personal injury action and to the extent the defendants allegedly breached a duty in that action the foreseeable harm was to the plaintiffs, not the trustee or the bankruptcy estate. Thus, under the circumstances presented here, the relationship of the plaintiffs to the personal injury action is unique and demands an exception to the general rule regarding privity … . Nicke v Schwartzapfel Partners, P.C., 2017 NY Slip Op 02437. 2nd Dept 3-29-17

 

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THREE YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR A FALSE ARREST CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER 42 USC 1983 BEGAN TO RUN UPON ARRAIGNMENT.

The First Department noted that the three year statute of limitations for a false arrest cause of action under 42 USC 1983 began to run upon arraignment:

The three-year limitations period on a section 1983 claim based on false arrest begins to run “when the alleged false imprisonment ends” — that is, when the arrestee becomes subject to the legal process such as being “bound over by a magistrate or arraigned on charges” … . Here, because plaintiff was arraigned on July 16, 2011, the limitations period on his section 1983 claim based on false arrest ended on July 16, 2014, approximately three months before plaintiff filed this action. Accordingly, the claim is time-barred. Cruz v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 02386, 1st Dept 3-28-17

 

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STATE’S RULING SCHOOL DISTRICT VIOLATED INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES ACT NOT FINAL, ARTICLE 78 PROCEEDING CHALLENGING RULING PROPERLY DISMISSED.

The Court of Appeals determined the petitioner school district could not bring an Article 78 proceeding to challenge the state’s finding that the district’s dispute resolution practices for placing students with disabilities violated federal (Individuals with Disabilities Education Act [IDEA]) and state law because the state’s decision was not final:

In 2012, the State found that the District’s dispute resolution practices violated federal and state law and directed the District to take corrective action. Although the State informed the District that failure to comply could result in further enforcement actions, including withholding federal funds, the State did not make a final decision to withhold funds.

A proceeding under CPLR article 78 “shall not be used to challenge a determination which is not final or can be adequately reviewed by appeal to a court or to some other body or officer” … . Likewise, this Court has recognized that “[t]o challenge an administrative determination, the agency action must be final and binding upon the petitioner” … . In addition, in the absence of injury, there is no standing to bring an article 78 proceeding … .

Assuming, without deciding, that a school district may bring an article 78 proceeding to challenge a final determination by the State under the IDEA, here, the State has not made a final determination, the District has not shown that it has exhausted its administrative remedies, and the District is unable to articulate any actual, concrete injury that it has suffered at this juncture. Accordingly, the District’s petition was properly dismissed. Matter of East Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist. v King, 2017 NY Slip Op 02360, CtApp 3-28-17

 

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DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW DOES NOT APPLY TO DISCOVERY REQUEST FOR GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS UNDER THE CPLR.

In the context of a suit against the county, the Fourth Department determined the deliberative process privilege (also called the inter-agency or intra-agency materials exception) which applies to documents requested under the Freedom of Information Law does not apply to discovery request under the CPLR:

Both the CPLR and FOIL provide for disclosure of documents. The former controls discovery between litigants in court proceedings, and the latter permits disclosure of governmental records to the public even in the absence of litigation. “When a public agency is one of the litigants, this means that it has the distinct disadvantage of having to offer its adversary two routes into its records” … . The deliberative process privilege or exemption under FOIL seeks “to protect the deliberative process of the government by ensuring that persons in an advisory role [will] be able to express their opinions freely to agency decision makers” … . While some courts have applied that privilege outside the FOIL context … , we decline to do so inasmuch as the Court of Appeals “has never created nor recognized a generalized deliberative process privilege’ ” … .

We “recognize[] the existence of some cases which all too casually mention the deliberate process privilege’ and purport to apply it outside the context of a FOIL proceeding” … . Nevertheless, it is also important to recognize that “privileges simply do not exist in the absence of either constitutional or statutory authority, or, when created as a matter of jurisprudence” … . Although the County seeks to assert “the so-called deliberative process privilege[,]’ ” in the context of a civil litigation, “neither the Court of Appeals’ case law nor that of the [Fourth] Department can be construed [as] having created a distinct deliberate process privilege’ outside the context of a FOIL proceeding” … . Mosey v County of Erie, 2017 NY Slip Op 02201, 4th Dept 3-24-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW DOES NOT APPLY TO DISCOVERY REQUEST FOR GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS UNDER THE CPLR)/FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW (FOIL) (DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW DOES NOT APPLY TO DISCOVERY REQUEST FOR GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS UNDER THE CPLR)/MUNICIPAL LAW (DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW DOES NOT APPLY TO DISCOVERY REQUEST FOR GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS UNDER THE CPLR)/DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE (FOIL, DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW DOES NOT APPLY TO DISCOVERY REQUEST FOR GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS UNDER THE CPLR)/INTER OR INTRA AGENCY EXCEPTION (FOIL, DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW DOES NOT APPLY TO DISCOVERY REQUEST FOR GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS UNDER THE CPLR)

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PLAINTIFF WAS NOT INJURED ON THE CONSTRUCTION SITE, LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, LABOR LAW 200 AND NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION WERE VIABLE HOWEVER, USE OF ALIAS WAS NOT A FRAUD UPON THE COURT.

The Second Department determined the Labor Law 241(6) cause of action should have been dismissed because plaintiff was not injured on the construction site but rather on a storage site a few blocks away. Plaintiff was injured when he stepped in a hole. However the Labor Law 200 cause of action was viable. The Second Department also determined the plaintiff’s use of an alias to bring suit was not a fraud upon the court (plaintiff is an undocumented immigrant) but held that the complaint should be amended to reflect his actual name:

Turning to the plaintiff’s Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action, Royal and Vista established, prima facie, that at the time of the accident the plaintiff was not working in a construction area within the meaning of Labor Law § 241(6) … . They submitted evidence which established that the lot where the accident occurred was located several blocks away from the construction area, and was used to store materials. There was no construction taking place at the lot, and the plaintiff’s accident occurred as he was taking materials to a truck so they could be transported to the construction site. In opposition to this prima facie showing by Royal and Vista, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. …

With respect to the plaintiff’s Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence causes of action, this accident arose not from the manner in which the work was performed, but rather from an allegedly dangerous condition at the work site. Under such circumstances, liability may be imposed if the property owner created the condition or had actual or constructive notice of it, and failed to remedy the condition within a reasonable amount of time … . Similarly, a general contractor may be held liable in common-law negligence and under Labor Law § 200 if it had control over the work site and actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition … . Bessa v Anflo Indus., Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 02013, 2nd Dept 3-22-17

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (PLAINTIFF WAS NOT INJURED ON THE CONSTRUCTION SITE, LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, LABOR LAW 200 AND NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION WERE VIABLE HOWEVER)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (PLAINTIFF WAS NOT INJURED ON THE CONSTRUCTION SITE, LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, LABOR LAW 200 AND NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION WERE VIABLE HOWEVER, USE OF ALIAS WAS NOT A FRAUD UPON THE COURT)/ALIAS (BRINGING SUIT USING AN ALIAS WAS NOT A FRAUD ON THE COURT)/FRAUD (FRAUD UPON THE COURT, BRINGING SUIT USING AN ALIAS WAS NOT A FRAUD ON THE COURT)

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GUARANTY WHICH DID NOT HAVE A FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE DEEMED TO BE SUBJECT TO THE CLAUSE IN A RELATED CONTRACT EXECUTED CLOSE IN TIME, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN LIEU OF COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, OUTSIDE PROOF NECESSARY.

The Second Department determined the forum selection clause in the loan contract was enforceable and applied to the related guaranty (which did not include a similar clause). The Second Department further determined Supreme Court should not have granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint because proof of the amount owed required proof in addition to the documents:

… “[D]ocuments executed at about the same time and covering the same subject matter are to be interpreted together, even if one does not incorporate the terms of the other by reference, and even if they are not executed on the same date, so long as they are substantially’ contemporaneous” … . Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the agreement and guaranty were executed sufficiently close in time and relate to the same subject matter, such that they should be interpreted together to determine the parties’ intent to be bound by the forum selection clause … . * * *

Although an unconditional guarantee may qualify as an instrument for the payment of money only … , here, neither the guaranty nor the underlying agreement relied upon by the plaintiff in support of its motion contains an unconditional promise to pay a sum certain, signed by the maker and due on demand or at a definite future time … . Since proof outside of the guaranty and underlying agreement is required to establish the amount of Platinum’s obligation to the plaintiff pursuant to the agreement, the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint should have been denied, with the motion and answering papers deemed to be the complaint and answer, respectively … . Oak Rock Fin., LLC v Rodriguez, 2017 NY Slip Op 02048, 2nd Dept 3-22-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (GUARANTY WHICH DID NOT HAVE A FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE DEEMED TO BE SUBJECT TO THE CLAUSE IN A RELATED CONTRACT EXECUTED CLOSE IN TIME, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN LIEU OF COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, OUTSIDE PROOF NECESSARY)/CONTRACT LAW (FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE, (GUARANTY WHICH DID NOT HAVE A FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE DEEMED TO BE SUBJECT TO THE CLAUSE IN A RELATED CONTRACT EXECUTED CLOSE IN TIME, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN LIEU OF COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, OUTSIDE PROOF NECESSARY)/GUARANTY ((GUARANTY WHICH DID NOT HAVE A FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE DEEMED TO BE SUBJECT TO THE CLAUSE IN A RELATED CONTRACT EXECUTED CLOSE IN TIME, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN LIEU OF COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, OUTSIDE PROOF NECESSARY)/SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN LIEU OF COMPLAINT (GUARANTY WHICH DID NOT HAVE A FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE DEEMED TO BE SUBJECT TO THE CLAUSE IN A RELATED CONTRACT EXECUTED CLOSE IN TIME, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN LIEU OF COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, OUTSIDE PROOF NECESSARY)

FOUR-MONTH ARTICLE 78 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS STARTS WHEN THE PETITIONER’S ATTORNEY IS NOTIFIED OF THE CHALLENGED DETERMINATION, NOT WHEN PETITIONER IS NOTIFIED.

The Second Department determined the four-month statute of limitations for bringing an Article 78 action starts when petitioner’s attorney is notified of the challenged determination, not when the petitioner is notified:

Contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, the four-month statute of limitations did not begin to run when the petitioner was personally served with a copy of the respondents’ letter notifying him that his employment had been terminated. At that time, the respondents were on notice that the petitioner had retained counsel to represent him in connection with the disciplinary charges. ” [B]asic procedural dictates and . . . fundamental policy considerations . . . require that once counsel has appeared in a matter a Statute of Limitations or time requirement cannot begin to run unless that counsel is served with the determination or the order or judgment sought to be reviewed'” … . Under the circumstances of this case, the respondents were required to serve a copy of the letter on the petitioner’s counsel in order for the statute of limitations to commence running … . Matter of Munroe v Ponte, 2017 NY Slip Op 02041, 2nd Dept 3-22-17

CIVIL PROCEDURE (FOUR-MONTH ARTICLE 78 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS STARTS WHEN THE PETITIONER’S ATTORNEY IS NOTIFIED OF THE CHALLENGED DETERMINATION, NOT WHEN PETITIONER IS NOTIFIED)/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (ARTICLE 78, FOUR-MONTH ARTICLE 78 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS STARTS WHEN THE PETITIONER’S ATTORNEY IS NOTIFIED OF THE CHALLENGED DETERMINATION, NOT WHEN PETITIONER IS NOTIFIED)/ARTICLE 78 (FOUR-MONTH ARTICLE 78 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS STARTS WHEN THE PETITIONER’S ATTORNEY IS NOTIFIED OF THE CHALLENGED DETERMINATION, NOT WHEN PETITIONER IS NOTIFIED)

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