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Entries by Bruce Freeman

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THE PLANNING BOARD TOOK THE REQUISITE HARD LOOK REQUIRED BY THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) WHEN IT APPROVED THE DEVELOPMENT WHICH INCLUDED APARTMENTS AND A COSTCO RETAIL FACILITY; SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ANNULLED THE APPROVAL AS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, in an exhaustive analysis which cannot be fairly summarized here, determined the Planning Board took the required hard look, pursuant to the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEGRA), at all the aspects of the proposed development project. Therefore the Planning Board’s approval of the project should not have been […]

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PLAINTIFF BANK’S MOVING FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT TWO YEARS AFTER THE DEFENDANT’S DEFAULT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT INTEND TO ABANDON THE ACTION; THEREFORE DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO CPLR 3215 (C) (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff did not demonstrate an adequate excuse for failure to take steps to enter a default judgment in this foreclosure action within one year of the default: The plaintiff’s … argument … [is] that, by moving for summary judgment and leave to enter a default judgment … , […]

PLAINTIFFS’ ATTORNEY PROPERLY WITHDREW ON IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES GROUNDS AND WAS ENTITLED TO 95% OF THE CONTINGENCY FEE DESPITE THE FAILURE TO SUBMIT TIME RECORDS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s attorney, Greenberg, properly withdrew from representing the plaintiffs on the ground of irreconcilable differences and was entitled to 95% of the contingency fee: Greenberg demonstrated its entitlement to an award of 95% of the contingency fee. “In fixing an award of legal fees in quantum meruit, a […]

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DEFENDANT PROPERTY OWNERS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE DECORATIVE FENCE IN THE GRASSY AREA BETWEEN THE CURB AND THE SIDEWALK WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant property-owner was not entitled to summary judgment in this slip and fall case. The plaintiff allegedly tripped over a decorative fence located in the grassy area between the curb and the sidewalk abutting defendants’ home. The defendants argued the fence was open and obvious: “The determination of […]

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IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, PROOF OF GENERAL CLEANING AND INSPECTION PRACTICES WAS NOT ENOUGH TO DEMONSTRATE THE LACK OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF LIQUID ON THE FLOOR (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant did not demonstrate it didn’t have constructive notice of the liquid on the floor in this slip and fall case. Proof of general cleaning and inspection practices is not enough: … [T]he defendant failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether it had constructive […]

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IN THIS STREET STOP CASE, SOME OF THE POLICE OFFICERS’ TESTIMONY WAS REJECTED AS INCREDIBLE; THE PEOPLE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE LEVEL THREE ENCOUNTER WAS JUSTIFIED BY REASONABLE SUSPICION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, dismissing the indictment, determined the People did not demonstrate the level three encounter with the defendant in the street stop was justified by reasonable suspicion. Some of the police officers’ testimony was rejected as incredible: Officer Washington’s pursuit of the defendant and her attempt to grab him with her right hand were […]

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INDICTMENTS IN TWO COUNTIES RELATED TO THE SAME CONTINUOUS CONDUCT AND THE SAME VICTIM; DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION BY GUILTY PLEA IN NASSAU COUNTY AFTER A GUILTY PLEA IN SUFFOLK COUNTY VIOLATED THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, on double-jeopardy grounds, reversed defendant’s conviction by guilty plea in Nassau County because he had already pled guilty to the same conduct in Suffolk County: The charges in Suffolk County and Nassau County related to the same alleged victim. The Suffolk County indictment alleged that the defendant committed acts constituting course of […]

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STATEMENTS MADE BY THE COMPLAINANT TO POLICE OFFICERS HOURS AFTER THE ALLEGED INCIDENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AS EXCITED UTTERANCES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant assault and criminal possession of a weapon convictions, determined the complainant’s hearsay statement should not have been admitted as excited utterances: … [T]he Supreme Court erred in permitting the People to elicit testimony from two police officers on the content of certain hearsay statements made to them by the complainant […]

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THE EVIDENCE OF “PHYSICAL INJURY” WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT, ASSAULT 2ND CONVICTION REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s Assault 2nd conviction, determined the evidence of “physical injury” was legally insufficient: … [T]he evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution … , was legally insufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the complainant sustained a physical injury within the meaning of Penal Law § […]

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