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PLAINTIFFS’ ATTORNEY PROPERLY WITHDREW ON IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES GROUNDS AND WAS ENTITLED TO 95% OF THE CONTINGENCY FEE DESPITE THE FAILURE TO SUBMIT TIME RECORDS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s attorney, Greenberg, properly withdrew from representing the plaintiffs on the ground of irreconcilable differences and was entitled to 95% of the contingency fee:

Greenberg demonstrated its entitlement to an award of 95% of the contingency fee. “In fixing an award of legal fees in quantum meruit, a court should consider evidence of the time and skill required in the case, the complexity of the matter, the attorney’s experience, ability, and reputation, the client’s benefit derived from the services, and the fee usually charged by attorneys for similar services” … . “‘Quantum meruit compensation is not limited to a calculation based on the numbers of hours worked multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate'” … . “The calculation of an award of legal fees as a portion of a contingent fee and based on an hourly rate are both properly fixed as quantum meruit determinations” … . Here, the record demonstrates, inter alia, the extensive work performed on the case by Greenberg over a period of 4½ years, the nature of the work performed, and the relative contributions made by Greenberg, entitling it to 95% of the contingency fee. While Greenberg failed to submit time records in support of the services it rendered, the value of its services could still be ascertained … . Tucker v Schwartzapfel Lawyers, P.C., 2021 NY Slip Op 04250, Second Dept 7-7-21

 

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