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INDICTMENTS IN TWO COUNTIES RELATED TO THE SAME CONTINUOUS CONDUCT AND THE SAME VICTIM; DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION BY GUILTY PLEA IN NASSAU COUNTY AFTER A GUILTY PLEA IN SUFFOLK COUNTY VIOLATED THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, on double-jeopardy grounds, reversed defendant’s conviction by guilty plea in Nassau County because he had already pled guilty to the same conduct in Suffolk County:

The charges in Suffolk County and Nassau County related to the same alleged victim. The Suffolk County indictment alleged that the defendant committed acts constituting course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree and course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree between approximately April 2015 and March 1, 2016, whereas the Nassau County indictment alleged that the defendant committed acts constituting course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree between approximately March 1, 2016, and September 1, 2016.

As the indictments in both counties, viewed together, alleged a single continuing and uninterrupted offense against the same alleged victim, constitutional double jeopardy principles precluded a second conviction, in Nassau County, after the Suffolk County criminal action terminated in a conviction by plea of guilty … . People v Kattis, 2021 NY Slip Op 04240, Second Dept 7-7-21

 

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