The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the causes of action alleging exposure to toxic fumes and hazardous substances were time-barred: … [T]he … causes of action [alleging] the purported exposure to toxic fumes and hazardous substances (exposure claims) because they are untimely under the applicable three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214-c [2]). … […]
The Fourth Department dismissed course of criminal conduct first degree and rape first degree counts as inclusory concurrent counts of predatory sexual assault against a child: … [C]ounts two and four of the indictment, charging defendant with course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree (Penal Law § 130.75 [1] [b]) and […]
The Fourth Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Troutman, determined mother’s cross petition to relocate with the child was properly granted, despite mother’s violation of a court order prohibiting her from permanently leaving Monroe County with the child without father’s consent, or without a court order allowing relocation. Mother testified that father was abusive […]
The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the petitioner’s Article 78 action should have been dismissed because it was not properly commenced within four months. An attempt to commence the action was timely made, but the petition was returned: An article 78 proceeding must be commenced within four months of the final determination under review […]
The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there was a question of fact whether defendants had constructive notice of the condition of a step in this slip and fall case: … [T]he affidavit of plaintiff’s expert and the photographic evidence were sufficient to raise an issue of fact as to constructive notice. The expert opined […]
The First Department, holding the appeal in abeyance, noted that a suppression motion may not be denied on a ground not raised by the People: The motion to suppress should not have been denied on a ground not raised by the People. It is unclear to what extent the suppression court considered and credited the […]
The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Moulton, overruling precedent, determined it is no longer necessary for an attorney to retype his or her name in an email stipulation of settlement. As long as the attorney’s name appears in the “prepopulated” area of the email it will be deemed to […]
The Third Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined County Court should not have denied defendant’s request for a circumstantial evidence jury instruction: … [T]here was no direct evidence identifying defendant as the shooter or as having possessed a loaded firearm. Indeed, there was no DNA or fingerprint evidence linking defendant to the Colt .45 caliber handgun […]
The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Lynch, discussed the applicability of the new practice rules for appeals to cross-appeals: … [T]he new practice rules pertaining to cross appeals specify that “[t]he party that first perfects the appeal shall be denominated the appellant-respondent” (Rules of App Div, All Depts [22 NYCRR] § 1250.9 […]
The Third Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the complaint stated a cause of action for breach of contract. The complaint alleged the agreement to convey a farm to a partnership was subject to an exception to the statute of frauds for part performance: “General Obligations Law § 5-703 (4) has carved out an exception […]
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