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TO THE EXTENT VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW SECTION 370 HAS BEEN INTERPRETED TO REQUIRE RENTAL-CAR COMPANIES TO PROVIDE PRIMARY LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE TO RENTER-DRIVERS, SECTION 370 IS PREEMPTED BY THE FEDERAL “GRAVES AMENDMENT” (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Singas, affirming the Appellate Division, over a three-judge dissent, determined the federal “Graves Amendment (49 USC 30106),” which relieves rental-car companies of vicarious liability for the negligence of the renter-drivers, preempts Vehicle and Traffic Law 370 to the extent that section 370 has been interpreted […]

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THE WILL BEQUEATHED THE REAL PROPERTY TO PLAINTIFF ALONE; THE DEFENDANT ADMINSTRATOR DREW UP A DEED WHICH TRANSFERRED THE PROPERTY TO PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT AS JOINT TENANTS; THE ISSUE WAS WHETHER THE DEED IS VOID AB INITIO OR VOIDABLE; THE SECOND DEPARTMENT DETERMINED THE DEED WAS VOIDABLE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Landicino, determined that the deed drawn up by defendant, the administrator of the decedent’s estate, which was inconsistent with a specific bequest in the will, was voidable, not void ab initio. The will bequeathed the real property to plaintiff alone. The defendant administrator […]

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HERE THE TRIAL TESTIMONY ABOUT THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE DEFENDANT’S VOICE WAS MUCH LESS DEFINITIVE AND UNEQUIVOCAL THAN THE TESTIMONY AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING, RAISING A QUESTION WHETHER THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE FOR DEFENDANT’S ARREST; DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MOVE TO REOPEN THE SUPPRESSION HEARING; MATTER REMITTED FOR A REOPENED HEARING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, remitting the matter for a reopened suppression hearing, determined defense counsel was ineffective for failing to move to reopen the hearing based upon discrepancies between the testimony at the suppression hearing and at trial. The trial testimony was less definitive and unequivocal, raising a question about whether there was probable cause for […]

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IT WAS ERROR FOR THE JUDGE TO DELEGATE TO THE ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN’S SERVICES (ASC) THE AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE MOTHER’S THERAPEUTIC SUPERVISED PARENTAL ACCESS; ELEVEN-YEAR-OLD AUTHORITY TO THE CONTRARY SHOULD NOT BE FOLLOWED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Family Court, determined it was error for the judge to delegate to the Administration for Children’s Services (ACS) the authority to determine mother’s therapeutic supervised parental access. The Second Department made it clear that its decision to the contrary in Matter of Victoria P. (Victor P.), 121 AD 2d 1006, […]

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DEFENDANT IN THIS FORECLOSURE TRANSFERRED THE SUBJECT PROPERTY TO A THIRD PARTY DURING THE PROCEEDINGS WHICH ORDINARILY WOULD DIVEST DEFENDANT OF STANDING; HOWEVER, PLAINTIFF DID NOT WAIVE A DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT AND THE TIME FOR SEEKING A DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT HAD NOT PASSED; BECAUSE DEFENDANT RETAINED AN INTEREST IN DEFENDING AGAINST A DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT, DEFENDANT HAD STANDING TO ARGUE THE RPAPL 1304 NOTICE WAS JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE; THE NOTICE ARGUMENT, HOWEVER, WAS REJECTED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Moulton, determined defendant in this foreclosure action had standing to argue the RPAPL 1304 notice of foreclosure was jurisdictionally defective, despite defendant’s transfer of the subject real property during the foreclosure proceedings. Plaintiff had not waived a deficiency judgment and the time for seeking one had […]

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DEFENDANT’S 30.30 (“SPEEDY TRIAL”) MOTION WAS MADE ON THE DAY TRIAL WAS TO BEGIN; THE ARGUMENT THAT THE MOTION WAS UNTIMELY BECAUSE THE PEOPLE WERE STATUTORILY ENTITLED TO “REASONABLE NOTICE” WAS REJECTED; THE TRIAL JUDGE IS FREE TO ADJOURN THE TRIAL, OR PROCEED WITH THE TRIAL AND HEAR THE SPEEDY TRIAL MOTION SUBSEQUENTLY (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Garcia, reversing the Appellate Division, determined defendant’s 30.30 (“speedy trial”) motion was timely made right before trial. The argument that bringing the motion right before trial violated the statutory provision that the motion be made upon “reasonable notice” to the People was rejected. Once the […]

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THE FOURTH TRIAL, AT WHICH DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED OF MURDER AND WEAPON POSSESSION, TOOK PLACE THREE YEARS AFTER THE LAST OF THREE MISTRIALS; DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL; CHARGES DISMISSED (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, dismissing defendant’s murder and weapon possession charges, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, over the three-judge dissent, determined that the three-year delay between the third mistrial and the fourth trial violated defendant’s right to a speedy trial: … [W]e conclude that the three-year delay to retry defendant a fourth time […]

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PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DEEM A NOTICE OF CLAIM TIMELY SERVED IN THIS FALSE ARREST AND BATTERY ACTION AGAINST THE CITY DEFENDANTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; PLAINTIFF’S EXCUSE FOR LATE FILING WAS INADEQUATE; PLAINTIFF DID NOT SHOW THE CITY DEFENDANTS HAD TIMELY KNOWLEDGE OF THE NATURE OF THE CLAIM; AND PLAINTIFF DID NOT SHOW THE CITY WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE 11-MONTH DELAY IN FILING (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion to deem a notice of claim timely served should not have been granted. The excuse for failing to timely file was not sufficient, plaintiff failed show the city defendants had timely knowledge of the claim, and plaintiff did not demonstrate the city defendants were not prejudiced […]

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A POLICE OFFICER INTERVIEWED AN EYEWITNESS AND CREATED A “PROBABLE CAUSE I-CARD” FOR THE ARREST OF THE DEFENDANT; THE ARRESTING OFFICER DID NOT TESTIFY AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING; THEREFORE THE PEOPLE DID NOT PROVE THE ARRESTING OFFICER SAW AND RELIED ON THE I-CARD, WHICH THE “FELLOW OFFICER” RULE REQUIRES FOR A LAWFUL ARREST; DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (CT APP). ​

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Halligan, determined the motion to suppress defendant’s statement should have been granted because the People failed to prove the arrest was based upon the “fellow officer” rule, An officer who interviewed a witness created a probable-cause I-card which was posted to […]

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PLAINTIFF SUED A CHURCH ALLEGING THE CHURCH HELD PROPERTY IN TRUST FOR PLAINTIFF AND THE CHURCH WRONGFULLY OUSTED PLAINTIFF FROM THE PROPERTY; RESOLUTION OF THE SUIT WOULD INVOLVE NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW, NOT RELIGIOUS PRINCIPLES; THEREFORE, THE LAWSUIT WAS NOT PRECLUDED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the lawsuit concerning ownership of church property was not precluded by the First Amendment because the suit could be decided by applying neutral principles of civil law, not religious principles: The complaint alleged, among other things, that Synod held the church property in trust for the plaintiff, as […]

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