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PROCEEDING UNDER REVIEW WAS NOT QUASI-JUDICIAL, SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE STANDARD DID NOT APPLY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the “substantial evidence” standard did not apply to review of the Unified Court System’s finding that the court assistant (petitioner) was not asked to do out-of-title work. The “arbitrary and capricious” standard was the proper one:

Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, “a substantial evidence’ question is presented only where a quasi-judicial evidentiary hearing has been held”… . The fact that the petitioner had the “right to be heard . . . and to present facts in support of [his] position” at a grievance meeting …did not render the grievance meeting “a quasi-judicial proceeding involving the cross-examination of witnesses and the making of a record within the meaning of CPLR 7803(4)”… . Since the administrative determination in this case was made after a grievance meeting, as opposed to a quasi-judicial evidentiary hearing, the court properly concluded that the relevant standard of review was whether the “determination was made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law, or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion” … .

The petitioner further contends that the Deputy Director’s determination was arbitrary and capricious. “An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts” … . “In applying the arbitrary and capricious’ standard, a court inquires whether the determination under review had a rational basis” … . Matter of Manning v New York State-Unified Ct. Sys., 2017 NY Slip Op 06077, Second Dept 8-9-17

 

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (EVIDENCE, PROCEEDING UNDER REVIEW WAS NOT QUASI-JUDICIAL, SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE STANDARD DID NOT APPLY (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PROCEEDING UNDER REVIEW WAS NOT QUASI-JUDICIAL, SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE STANDARD DID NOT APPLY (SECOND DEPT))/SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PROCEEDING UNDER REVIEW WAS NOT QUASI-JUDICIAL, SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE STANDARD DID NOT APPLY (SECOND DEPT))/ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,  PROCEEDING UNDER REVIEW WAS NOT QUASI-JUDICIAL, SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE STANDARD DID NOT APPLY (SECOND DEPT))/QUASI-JUDICIAL (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,  PROCEEDING UNDER REVIEW WAS NOT QUASI-JUDICIAL, SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE STANDARD DID NOT APPLY (SECOND DEPT))

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