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NO DUTY OF CARE OWED PLAINTIFF, DEFENDANTS DID NOT OWN, OCCUPY OR CONTROL THE STAIRCASE WHERE PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the defendants demonstrated they did not own, occupy or control the area where plaintiff slipped and fell. Therefore the defendants owed no duty of care to the plaintiff:

“To establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must establish the existence of a duty owed by a defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and that such breach was a proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff” … . Where there is no duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, there can be no breach, and thus, no liability can be imposed upon the defendant … . Liability for a dangerous condition on property is generally predicated upon ownership, occupancy, control, or special use of the property… . The existence of one or more of these elements is sufficient to give rise to a duty of care… . Where none is present, “[generally] a party cannot be held liable for injuries caused by the allegedly defective condition” … .

Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that they did not owe a duty to the plaintiff by demonstrating that they did not own, occupy, or control the area where the subject accident occurred, and thus, that they did not have a duty to maintain the staircase on the date of the accident. Donatien v Long Is. Coll. Hosp., 2017 NY Slip Op 06061, Second Dept 8-9-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (SLIP AND FALL, NO DUTY OF CARE OWED PLAINTIFF, DEFENDANTS DID NOT OWN, OCCUPY OR CONTROL THE STAIRCASE WHERE PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL (SECOND DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL (NO DUTY OF CARE OWED PLAINTIFF, DEFENDANTS DID NOT OWN, OCCUPY OR CONTROL THE STAIRCASE WHERE PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL (SECOND DEPT))/DUTY OF CARE (SLIP AND FALL, NO DUTY OF CARE OWED PLAINTIFF, DEFENDANTS DID NOT OWN, OCCUPY OR CONTROL THE STAIRCASE WHERE PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL (SECOND DEPT))

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PROCEEDING UNDER REVIEW WAS NOT QUASI-JUDICIAL, SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE STANDARD... DEFENDANT COLLEGE DEMONSTRATED IT DID NOT CREATE OR HAVE NOTICE OF THE CONDITION...