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THE BANK IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT SEND DEFENDANT THE NOTICE OF DEFAULT IN A SEPARATE ENVELOPE AS REQUIRED BY RPAPL 1304; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant in this foreclosure action was entitled to summary judgment because the bank did not send the notice of default in a separate envelope as required by RPAPL 1304:

RPAPL 1304(1) provides that “at least ninety days before a lender, an assignee or a mortgage loan servicer commences legal action against the borrower . . . , including mortgage foreclosure, such lender, assignee or mortgage loan servicer shall give notice to the borrower.” “Strict compliance with RPAPL 1304 notice to the borrower or borrowers is a condition precedent to the commencement of a foreclosure action” … . RPAPL 1304(2) states that “[t]he notices required by this section shall be sent by the lender, assignee or mortgage loan servicer in a separate envelope from any other mailing or notice.”

The defendant established that the plaintiff failed to strictly comply with RPAPL 1304, on the ground that additional material was sent in the same envelope as the 90-day notice required by RPAPL 1304 … . U.S. Bank N.A. v Hinds, 2022 NY Slip Op 02150, Second Dept 3-30-22

Practice Point: Here the borrower’s motion to dismiss the foreclosure complaint was granted because the bank sent the notice of default required by RPAPL 1304 in an envelope along with other materials, violating the “separate envelope” rule.

 

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AT THE TIME THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS COMMENCED, RPAPL 1304 REQUIRED THAT... ALTHOUGH DEFENDANTS WERE NOT PROPERLY SERVED IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION AND...