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You are here: Home1 / Foreclosure2 / AT THE TIME THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS COMMENCED, RPAPL 1304 REQUIRED...
Foreclosure, Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)

AT THE TIME THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS COMMENCED, RPAPL 1304 REQUIRED THAT THE NOTICE OF DEFAULT INCLUDE THE NUMBER OF DAYS THE BORROWER HAD BEEN IN DEFAULT; A DISCREPENCY BETWEEN THE DATE OF THE DEFAULT IN THE 90-DAY NOTICE (JULY 2009) AND THE DATE IN THE NOTICE REQUIRED BY THE MORTGAGE AND IN THE COMPLAINT (MAY 2011) CREATED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE NOTICE WAS DEFECTIVE ON ITS FACE (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the bank in this foreclosure action was not entitled to summary judgment because it failed to demonstrate compliance with the notice requirements of RPAPL 1304. At the time the action was commenced, RPAPL 1304 required the notice to state the number of days the borrower had been in default. The 90-day notice stated defendant had been in default 2330 days, which put the default in July 2009. But the notice required by the mortgage and the complaint stated defendant was in default since May 2011:

The 90-day notice sent to the defendant stated that, as of November 18, 2015, her loan was 2330 days in default—indicating a default date in July 2009. However, both the notice of default required by the mortgage agreement and the complaint alleged that the plaintiff had defaulted on the loan in May 2011. At least one of these three documents, then, contained an error concerning information that was required under RPAPL 1304. Notably, the plaintiff’s response to the defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment did not attempt to clarify this discrepancy; it only addressed the service of the 90-day notice. The plaintiff’s appellate brief likewise does not address this issue. Accordingly, the plaintiff did not eliminate the existence of a triable issue of fact as to whether the RPAPL 1304 notice was defective on its face … . U.S. Bank N.A. v Cox, 2022 NY Slip Op 02149, Second Dept 3-30-22

Practice Point: In this foreclosure action, the 90-day notice put the defendant’s default in July 2009, but the notice required by the mortgage and the complaint put the default in May 2011. This raised a question of fact whether the notice required by RPAPL 1304 was defective on its face.

 

March 30, 2022/by Bruce Freeman
Tags: Second Department
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https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2022-03-30 14:25:322022-04-02 14:47:48AT THE TIME THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS COMMENCED, RPAPL 1304 REQUIRED THAT THE NOTICE OF DEFAULT INCLUDE THE NUMBER OF DAYS THE BORROWER HAD BEEN IN DEFAULT; A DISCREPENCY BETWEEN THE DATE OF THE DEFAULT IN THE 90-DAY NOTICE (JULY 2009) AND THE DATE IN THE NOTICE REQUIRED BY THE MORTGAGE AND IN THE COMPLAINT (MAY 2011) CREATED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE NOTICE WAS DEFECTIVE ON ITS FACE (SECOND DEPT). ​
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ALTHOUGH THE MUNICIPALITY PROVED IT DID NOT HAVE WRITTEN NOTICE OF THE ICY SIDEWALK... THE BANK IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT SEND DEFENDANT THE NOTICE OF DEFAULT...
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