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MOTION TO EXTEND TIME TO EFFECT SERVICE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion to extend the time to effect service in this foreclosure action should have been granted. The initial defective service was timely and the statute of limitations ran out before the defect could be cured:

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… [T]he Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 306-b for leave to extend its time to serve the summons and complaint upon [defendant] in the interest of justice … . While the action was timely commenced, the statute of limitations had expired when the plaintiff moved for this relief, the timely service of process was subsequently found to have been defective, there was no identifiable prejudice to [defendant] attributable to the delay in proper service, and the complaint appears to be potentially meritorious … . US Bank N.A. v Saintus, 2017 NY Slip Op 06567, Second Dept 9-20-17

CIVIL PROCEDURE (MOTION TO EXTEND TIME TO EFFECT SERVICE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/SERVICE OF PROCESS (MOTION TO EXTEND TIME TO EFFECT SERVICE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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