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ALTHOUGH THE DISPUTE BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND A RABBI INVOLVED THE PURCHASE OF TORAH BOOKS AND THE JEWISH CUSTOM OF SHIDUCH, THE MATTER COULD BE DECIDED BASED ON NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW IN THE STATE COURTS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined a dispute between plaintiff and a rabbi involved neutral principles of law and therefore could be adjudicated in the state court system:

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The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for breach of contract and fraud, alleging that she made several payments to the defendants totaling $214,000 for the purchase of three torah books, and for the defendants to find her a husband pursuant to the Jewish custom of “shiduch.” The plaintiff alleged that the defendants made false statements to induce her to make the payments, and had not performed pursuant to their agreement. …

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“The First Amendment forbids civil courts from interfering in or determining religious disputes, because there is substantial danger that the state will become entangled in essentially religious controversies or intervene on behalf of groups espousing particular doctrines or beliefs” … . However, “[c]ivil disputes involving religious parties or institutions may be adjudicated without offending the First Amendment as long as neutral principles of law are the basis for their resolution” … .

Here, the defendants failed to demonstrate that the plaintiff’s causes of action cannot be determined solely upon the application of neutral principles of law, without reference to religious principles … . Lifschitz v Sharabi, 2017 NY Slip Op 06530, 2nd Dept 9-20-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (ALTHOUGH THE DISPUTE BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND A RABBI INVOLVED THE PURCHASE OF TORAH BOOKS AND THE JEWISH CUSTOM OF SHIDUCH, THE MATTER COULD BE DECIDED BASED ON NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW IN THE STATE COURTS (SECOND DEPT))/CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (RELIGION, ALTHOUGH THE DISPUTE BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND A RABBI INVOLVED THE PURCHASE OF TORAH BOOKS AND THE JEWISH CUSTOM OF SHIDUCH, THE MATTER COULD BE DECIDED BASED ON NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW IN THE STATE COURTS (SECOND DEPT))/RELIGION (ALTHOUGH THE DISPUTE BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND A RABBI INVOLVED THE PURCHASE OF TORAH BOOKS AND THE JEWISH CUSTOM OF SHIDUCH, THE MATTER COULD BE DECIDED BASED ON NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW IN THE STATE COURTS (SECOND DEPT))

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