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You are here: Home1 / Labor Law-Construction Law2 / SIDEWALK REPAIR TOO FAR REMOVED FROM WORK ON A STRUCTURE, I.E., A GAS MAIN,...
Labor Law-Construction Law

SIDEWALK REPAIR TOO FAR REMOVED FROM WORK ON A STRUCTURE, I.E., A GAS MAIN, INJURY NOT WITHIN PURVIEW OF LABOR LAW 240 (1).

The Second Department determined the repair of a sidewalk damaged when a gas main was replaced did not fall within the reach of the Labor Law. Plaintiff was injured when a piece of the sidewalk fell from a backhoe. The court held that the sidewalk repair work was too far removed from the gas main replacement to trigger the Labor Law protections:

Supreme Court properly determined that, at the time of the accident, the injured plaintiff was not engaged in an enumerated activity under Labor Law § 240(1). That statute applies only to “the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure” … . Significantly, the statute does not cover an injury occurring after an enumerated activity is complete … . While the plaintiffs urge that the injured plaintiff’s work was part of a larger project involving the replacement of the gas main, the record reflects that the gas main replacement work was performed by a completely different entity and had been completed well before the injured plaintiff commenced any work at the location. Neither the injured plaintiff nor his employer played any role in the replacement of the gas main, and the work performed by the injured plaintiff and his coworkers constituted a separate and distinct phase of the overall project that involved only the demolition and restoration of a sidewalk … . Accordingly, under these circumstances, the plaintiff’s work did not fall within the purview of Labor Law § 240(1) … . Davis v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 01179, 2nd Dept 2-15-17

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (SIDEWALK REPAIR TOO FAR REMOVED FROM WORK ON A STRUCTURE, I.E., A GAS MAIN, INJURY NOT WITHIN PURVIEW OF LABOR LAW 240 (1))/SIDEWALK (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, SIDEWALK REPAIR TOO FAR REMOVED FROM WORK ON A STRUCTURE, I.E., A GAS MAIN, INJURY NOT WITHIN PURVIEW OF LABOR LAW 240 (1))/STRUCTURE (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, SIDEWALK REPAIR TOO FAR REMOVED FROM WORK ON A STRUCTURE, I.E., A GAS MAIN, INJURY NOT WITHIN PURVIEW OF LABOR LAW 240 (1))

February 15, 2017
Tags: Second Department
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