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DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFFS’ LABOR LAW 240(1), 241(6) AND 200 CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ motion for summary judgment should not have been granted in this Labor Law 240(1), 241(6) and 200 action. Plaintiff alleged he was directed to work without a scaffold. He rigged up a ladder with planks on it placed horizontally over a fire escape as a makeshift scaffold. The ladder tipped when a heavy object was placed on it and plaintiff fell:

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Under Labor Law § 240(1), owners and general contractors, and their agents, have a nondelegable duty to provide safety devices necessary to protect workers from risks inherent in elevated work sites … . “In order to prevail on a claim under Labor Law § 240(1), a plaintiff must establish that the statute was violated and that this violation was a proximate cause of his or her injuries” … . No recovery is available under Labor Law § 240(1) when the plaintiff’s actions were the sole proximate cause of the accident … .

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Here, the evidence submitted on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment failed to establish, prima facie, that no [Labor Law 240(1)] violation occurred, or that the alleged violation was not a proximate cause of the accident … . …

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Labor Law § 200 codifies the common-law duty of an owner or contractor to provide workers with a reasonably safe place to work … . * * *

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Here, the cause of action arose out of alleged defects or dangers in the methods or materials of the work. The defendants failed, prima facie, to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether [defendant] had the authority to supervise or control the injured plaintiff’s work, and as to causation … .

Labor Law § 241(6) imposes a nondelegable duty on owners and contractors to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety for workers and to comply with the specific safety rules and regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of the Department of Labor … .  Here, the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, a violation of Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) § 23-1.16, which requires, in relevant part, that safety belts and harnesses be properly attached to a tail line or lifeline so that “if the user should fall such fall shall not exceed five feet” … . King v Villette, 2017 NY Slip Op 07596, Second Dept 11-1-17

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFFS’ LABOR LAW 240(1), 241(6) AND 200 CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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EVIDENCE BEFORE THE GRAND JURY WAS LEGALLY SUFFICIENT, CRITERIA EXPLAINED.
PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION IN THIS FALLING OBJECT CASE; DEFENDANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE JOB WAS NOT A HARD HAT JOB PRECLUDING DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF’S LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).
HERE DEFENDANT’S NON-LAWYER HUSBAND REPRESENTED HER AT THE FORECLOSURE TRIAL; THE FACT THAT THE HUSBAND HAD A POWER OF ATTORNEY AUTHORIZING HIM TO ACT ON HIS WIFE’S BEHALF DID NOT AUTHORIZE HIM TO PRACTICE LAW; ALTHOUGH REPRESENTATION BY A NON-LAWYER DOES NOT RENDER THE PROCEEDINGS A “NULLITY,” HERE THE DEFENDANT WAS PREJUDICED BY HER HUSBAND’S REPRESENTATION AND THE JUDGE ERRED BY NOT ALLOWING THE HUSBAND TO TESTIFY; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).
Criteria for Collateral Estoppel Explained (Criteria Not Met Here)
THE ELECTRICAL-CONTRACTOR CORP WAS NOT LICENSED TO DO ELECTRICAL WORK IN NYC; THE FACT THAT THE CORPORATION’S VICE PRESIDENT WAS LICENSED AND THE VICE PRESIDENT’S COMPANY, WHICH DID THE ELECTRICAL WORK AS A SUBCONTRACTOR, WAS LICENSED DOESN’T MATTER; THE CORPORATION CAN NOT SUE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT (SECOND DEPT). ​
PLAINTIFF AND HIS ATTORNEY SENT 75 LETTERS TO HARASS DEFENDANTS; SANCTIONS FOR FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT SHOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSED (SECOND DEPT). ​
PROMPT MOTION TO STRIKE NOTE OF ISSUE AND CERTIFICATE OF READINESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DISCOVERY WAS NOT COMPLETE.
THE PLAINTIFF IN THIS WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT NURSING HOME IS THE DECEDENT’S DAUGHTER AND HAD SIGNED THE ADMISSION AGREEMENT AS THE “RESPONSIBLE PARTY;” THE LANGUAGE OF THE AGREEMENT DID NOT CREATE AN AGENCY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND HER MOTHER; THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE IN THE ADMISSION AGREEMENT COULD NOT, THEREFORE, BE ENFORCED BY THE NURSING HOME (SECOND DEPT).

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