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THE 90-DAY NOTICE WAS DEFECTIVE; THEREFORE THE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED PURSUANT TO CPLR 3216 (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the action should not have dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3216 because the 90-day notice was defective:

On November 20, 2012, the Supreme Court issued a certification order which, inter alia, certified the matter for trial and directed the plaintiff to file a note of issue within 90 days. The order provided that “[i]f plaintiff does not file a note of issue within 90 days this action is deemed dismissed without further order of the Court. (CPLR 3216).” The plaintiff failed to file a note of issue, and the action was ministerially dismissed, without further notice to the parties. …

An action cannot be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3216(a) “unless a written demand is served upon ‘the party against whom such relief is sought’ in accordance with the statutory requirements, along with a statement that the ‘default by the party upon whom such notice is served in complying with such demand within said ninety day period will serve as a basis for a motion by the party serving said demand for dismissal as against him [or her] for unreasonably neglecting to proceed'” … . …

The certification order, which purported to serve as a 90-day notice pursuant to CPLR 3216, was defective as it did not state that the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the demand would serve as a basis for the Supreme Court, on its own motion, to dismiss the action for failure to prosecute … . Moreover, it is evident from the record that the action was ministerially dismissed without a motion or notice to the parties, and there was no order of the court dismissing the action … . HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Arias, 2020 NY Slip Op 06108, Second Dept 10-28-20

 

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