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POLICE REPORT DID NOT NOTIFY TOWN OF THE ESSENTIAL FACTS OF A CLAIM STEMMING FROM A COLLISION WITH A TOWN SNOW PLOW, PETITION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined that a police report was not sufficient to timely notify the town of the essential facts of potential lawsuit stemming from a collision between petitioner’s vehicle and a town snow plow. The petition for leave to file a late notice of claim was properly denied:

… [T]he petitioner failed to demonstrate that the Village obtained timely, actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim. The late notice of claim served upon the Village approximately three months after the 90-day statutory period had elapsed did not provide the Village with actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within a reasonable time after the expiration of the statutory period … . Furthermore, the police accident report alone, without any evidence of further investigation by the Village, cannot be considered actual knowledge of the essential facts underlying the claim against the Village … . Matter of Vega v Incorporated Vil. of Freeport, 2018 NY Slip Op 05598, Second Dept 8-1-18

MUNICIPAL LAW (NEGLIGENCE, NOTICE OF CLAIM, POLICE REPORT DID NOT NOTIFY TOWN OF THE ESSENTIAL FACTS OF A CLAIM STEMMING FROM A COLLISION WITH A TOWN SNOW PLOW, PETITION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, NOTICE OF CLAIM, POLICE REPORT DID NOT NOTIFY TOWN OF THE ESSENTIAL FACTS OF A CLAIM STEMMING FROM A COLLISION WITH A TOWN SNOW PLOW, PETITION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/NOTICE OF CLAIM (MUNICIPAL LAW, NEGLIGENCE, OLICE REPORT DID NOT NOTIFY TOWN OF THE ESSENTIAL FACTS OF A CLAIM STEMMING FROM A COLLISION WITH A TOWN SNOW PLOW, PETITION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (MUNICIPAL LAW, NOTICE OF CLAIM, POLICE REPORT DID NOT NOTIFY TOWN OF THE ESSENTIAL FACTS OF A CLAIM STEMMING FROM A COLLISION WITH A TOWN SNOW PLOW, PETITION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))/POLICE REPORTS (NEGLIGENCE, NOTICE OF CLAIM, POLICE REPORT DID NOT NOTIFY TOWN OF THE ESSENTIAL FACTS OF A CLAIM STEMMING FROM A COLLISION WITH A TOWN SNOW PLOW, PETITION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT))

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