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JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WHEN PLAINTIFF BANK ATTEMPT TO TO BRING PREVIOUSLY FILED PAPERS INTO COMPLIANCE WITH SUBSEQUENT ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the judge should not have, sua sponte, dismissed the foreclosure action when plaintiff bank attempted to bring previously filed documents into compliance with subsequent administrative orders:

“A court’s power to dismiss a complaint, sua sponte, is to be used sparingly and only when extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant dismissal”… . Here, the plaintiff’s counsel attempted to comply, in good faith, with Administrative Orders 548/10 and 431/11 of the Chief Administrative Judge, which did not exist at the time of the commencement of the action, or at the time of the plaintiff’s prior motion for an order of reference. Under such circumstances, dismissal was not warranted. Nothing in the Administrative Orders requires the dismissal of an action merely because the plaintiff’s counsel discovers that there was some irregularity or defect in a prior submission, nor is the plaintiff effectively required to commence an entirely new action … . JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Laszlo, 2019 NY Slip Op 01205, Second Dept 2-20-19

 

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