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ONLY THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR OF THE COURTS HAS THE POWER TO APPOINT CHIEF CLERKS AND DEPUTY CHIEF CLERKS OF THE SURROGATE’S COURTS (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the Chief Administrator of the Courts, not the Surrogate’s Courts, has the power to appoint Chief Clerks and Deputy Chief Clerks of the Surrogate’s Courts:

Although the Chief Clerks and Deputy Chief Clerks of the Surrogates’ Courts possess significant authority, we agree with defendant that they are, nevertheless, nonjudicial officers. The Chief Clerks, for example, have the authority to sign papers or records of the courts, to adjourn matters, to administer oaths, to supervise disclosure and, in certain circumstances, to hear and report matters to the Surrogates (see SCPA 506 [6] [a]; 2609). Such responsibilities, however, are akin to those of referees (see SCPA 506; CPLR 4201), which are themselves “nonjudicial officers of the court appointed to assist it in the performance of its judicial functions” (… see generally CPLR 4312 [5] …). Thus, given the “nature of the position[s],” we agree with defendant that the Chief Clerks and Deputy Chief Clerks of the Surrogates’ Courts are nonjudicial positions and, “[a]s such, they are subject to the constitutional appointment power of the Chief Administrator, notwithstanding [article 26 of the Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act]. Since the appointment powers of the Chief Administrator flow from the State Constitution, they cannot be abrogated by statute” … . Mosey v Office of Ct. Admin., 2026 NY Slip Op 02538, Fourth Dept 4-24-24

 

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