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Violation of an Industrial Code Provision Does Not Conclusively Establish Negligence in a Labor Law 241 (6) Action

The Fourth Department noted that the fact that an Industrial Code provision was violated does not establish negligence sufficient to support partial summary judgment: “Despite our conclusion that defendants violated 12 NYCRR 23-9.5 (c), we reject plaintiff’s contention that he is entitled to partial summary judgment on the issue of defendants’ liability with respect to the Labor Law § 241 (6) claim. A violation of an Industrial Code provision ‘does not establish negligence as a matter of law but is merely some evidence to be considered on the question of a defendant’s negligence’…”.   Whether there was a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-9.5 (c) turned on whether plaintiff was a member of an “excavation crew.” If he was not, then his proximity to the equipment which injured him violated the provision. If he was a member of an “excavation crew,” the provision was not violated.  The majority determined plaintiff was not a member of a “crew” because he was the only person there.  The two dissenting judges disagreed and argued plaintiff was a member of an “excavation crew” within the meaning of the provision. Vanderwall v 1255 Portland Ave. LLC, 2015 NY Slip Op 03959, 4th Dept 5-8-15

 

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