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THE CLASS HAD STANDING TO SEEK DECLARATORY, INJUNCTIVE AND MONETARY RELIEF BASED UPON ALLEGATIONS THE COUNTY REAL PROPERTY TAX SYSTEM WAS IRRATIONAL, DISCRIMINATORY AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL RESULTING IN A SHIFT OF THE TAX BURDEN FROM THE WEALTHIER PREDOMINANTLY WHITE COMMUNITIES TO THE LOWER INCOME PREDOMINANTLY NONWHITE COMMUNITIES (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Barros, determined the class of property owners in Nassau County had standing to  seek declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief stemming from the “irrational, discriminatory and unconstitutional” real property tax system:

… [T]he plaintiffs allege that the County’s tax assessment policies and procedures, i.e., its freeze on reassessments from January 2010 until January 2018 and its use of a grievance procedure which was voluntary and yielded unscientific results unrelated to property values, shifted the property tax burden from wealthier, predominantly white communities in the County to lower income, predominantly nonwhite communities. The plaintiffs allege that from 2010 through 2016, property taxes on 61% of the County’s residential and commercial properties increased by only $466, or 5%, on average, whereas the average increase for the other 39% of County properties was six times that amount: $2,748, or 35.7%. They allege that most properties in predominantly nonwhite communities comprised that 39%, which amounted to an aggregate shift in the property tax burden onto the plaintiffs and those similarly situated in a sum in excess of $1.7 billion. * * *

… [T]he allegations in the complaint, if true, … establish standing, including that the plaintiffs suffered an injury-in-fact … . The plaintiffs “allege[d] that publicly-criticized systemic inequities have resulted in [more expensive] properties increasingly shouldering less of a tax burden than properties worth far less” … and alleged that they were “being treated differently from other, similarly-situated property owners, and that no rational basis exists for this allegedly disparate treatment” … . Hall v Nassau County, 2025 NY Slip Op 05796, Second Dept 10-22-25

Practice Point: Here the allegations made by the plaintiff class demonstrated an injury-in-fact stemming from the county’s property tax system, i.e., a shift in the tax burden from the wealthier predominantly white communities to the lower income predominantly nonwhite communities. Therefore the class demonstrated standing to bring the lawsuit.

 

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