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THERE WAS NO PROOF THE OFFICER WHO FRISKED THE DEFENDANT AND REMOVED A WALLET FROM DEFENDANT’S POCKET SUSPECTED THE WALLET WAS A WEAPON; THE WALLET, WHICH HAD BEEN STOLEN FROM THE VICTIM, SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED; BECAUSE THE WALLET TENDED TO IDENTIFY DEFENDANT AS THE ROBBER, THE ERROR WAS NOT HARMLESS; NEW TRIAL ORDERED ON THE ROBBERY-RELATED OFFENSES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the robbery-related convictions and ordering a new trial, determined the police did not have a lawful basis for removing a wallet from defendant’s pocket and examining its contents. There was no evidence that the lawful frisk of the defendant indicated the presence of a weapon. The wallet, which had been stolen from the victim, should have been suppressed. Because the robber was wearing a mask, finding the wallet on defendant’s person tended to identify defendant as the robber. The error in failing to suppress the wallet, therefore, was not harmless:

… [E]ven assuming that the officers were justified in performing a protective frisk … , there was no justification for searching the defendant’s pants pocket, reaching into it, and removing the wallet. In the course of conducting a protective pat-down based upon reasonable suspicion, “[o]nce an officer has concluded that no weapon is present, the search is over and there is no authority for further intrusion” … . There was no evidence presented at the suppression hearing that, during his frisk of the defendant, Nelson [the police officer] felt anything in the defendant’s pocket that seemed to be a weapon or that could have posed a danger to the officers at the scene. Indeed, Nelson did not testify at the hearing. Accordingly, there was no lawful basis for removing the wallet from the defendant’s pocket … , and that act violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures … . The officers committed an additional constitutional violation when, after retrieving the wallet from the defendant’s pocket, they opened it and conducted a warrantless search of its contents … . Since the officers lacked the factual predicate necessary to search the defendant’s pocket and the wallet’s contents, the People failed to satisfy their burden of going forward to establish the legality of the police conduct in the first instance, and thus the wallet and its contents, seized as a result of that search, should have been suppressed … . People v Lewis, 2025 NY Slip Op 05823, Second Dept 10-22-25

Practice Point: If a street frisk does not indicate the presence of a weapon, the seizure and examination of a wallet found in defendant’s pocket has no lawful basis.

 

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