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THE PROVISION OF THE CORRECTION LAW WHICH REQUIRES AN OUT-OF-STATE SEX OFFENDER TO BE CLASSIFIED AS A “SEXUALLY VIOLENT OFFENDER” UPON RESIDING IN NEW YORK, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE OUT-OF-STATE OFFENSE WAS VIOLENT, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO THIS DEFENDANT (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Taylor, determined the Correction Law provision requiring that an out-of-state sex-offender be automatically classified as a “sexually violent offender” upon residing in New York was unconstitutional as applied to the defendant:

Pursuant to Correction Law § 168-a(3)(b), the People … provided notice of their intent to seek a “sexually violent offender” designation for the defendant based on the out-of-state conviction because the defendant was required to register as a sex offender in Florida. * * *

We hold that the foreign registration clause, insofar as applied to the defendant, is not rationally related to a legitimate government interest, and therefore violates his substantive due process rights (see People v Brown, 41 NY3d at 284).

In particular, we agree with the Appellate Division, Fourth Department’s conclusion that, “[D]esignating [a] defendant as sexually violent merely because he [or she] had an out-of-state sex conviction requiring out-of-state registration, regardless of whether that underlying offense is violent—as is currently required by the text of Correction Law § 168-a(3)(b)—bears no rational relationship to the legitimate governmental interest of informing the public of threats posed by sex offenders” (People v Malloy, 228 AD3d at 1289).” People v Edwards, 2025 NY Slip Op 04922, Second Dept 9-10-25

Practice Point: Here the Correction Law provision requiring that out-of-state sex offenders be classified as “sexually violent offenders” upon residing in New York was deemed unconstitutional as applied to the defendant, whose out-of-state offense was nonviolent.​

 

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