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IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL’S AFFIDAVIT, WHICH WAS BASED SOLELY UPON READING THE COMPLAINT, DID NOT DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANT’S DEFAULT (SECOND DEPT).

he Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the affidavit by plaintiff’s counsel in this foreclosure action did not demonstrate defendant’s default:

Generally, in moving for summary judgment in an action to foreclose a mortgage, a plaintiff establishes its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law through the production of the mortgage, the unpaid note, and evidence of default … . “A plaintiff may establish a payment default by an admission made in response to a notice to admit (see CPLR 3212[b]; 3123), by an affidavit from ‘a person having [personal] knowledge of the facts’ (CPLR 3212[b]), or by other evidence ‘in admissible form'” … .

Here, in support of its motion, the plaintiff submitted the affirmation of its counsel, Jennie Shnayder, who attested to the borrower’s default in payment. However, Shnayder stated that the basis of her knowledge was her review of the complaint, and she did not attest that she had personal knowledge of the defendants’ alleged default in payment or annex to her affirmation any other evidence thereof in admissible form. Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy., FSB v E39 St., LLC, 2024 NY Slip Op 04417, Second Dept 9-11-24

Practice Point: A recurring evidentiary issue in foreclosure proceedings where the bank is seeking summary judgment is the sufficiency of evidence presented in the supporting affidavits. Unless the plaintiff’s affiant’s assertions are based on first-hand knowledge, or on business records that are attached, summary judgment is not supported.

 

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