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THE COUNTY POLICE OFFICER’S STATEMENT TO PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT TO THE EFFECT SHE HAD NO REASON TO FEEL UNSAFE DID NOT CREATE A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP; THEREFORE THE COUNTY WAS NOT LIABLE FOR THE SHOOTING DEATH OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT AT THE HANDS OF THE FATHER OF HER YOUNG CHILD (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the complaint failed to state a cause of action against the county stemming from the shooting death of plaintiff’s decedent at the hands of the father of her child (Jenkins). Plaintiff’s decedent had repeatedly requested of the county police that Jenkins be arrested and allegedly was told there was no reason for her to feel unsafe. The officer’s statement did not create a special relationship with the county such that the county could be held liable:

“Generally, a municipality may not be held liable for the failure to provide police protection because the duty to provide such protection is owed to the public at large, rather than to any particular individual” … . “A narrow exception to the rule exists where a special relationship exists between the municipality and the injured parties” … . The elements of a special relationship are (1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured, (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality’s agents that inaction could lead to harm, (3) some form of direct contact between the municipality’s agents and the injured party, and (4) the injured party’s justifiable reliance on the municipality’s affirmative undertaking … .

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contentions, the complaint fails to allege facts that could establish an affirmative undertaking or justifiable reliance on any such undertaking by the defendants … . The complaint alleged that the decedent was told by an officer, weeks before the killing, that the officer “did not see any reason why Mr. Jenkins would hurt [the decedent or her sister] and that there was no reason for them to feel unsafe.” This statement, or statements to that effect, which could not be construed as conveying any promise or intention to protect the decedent, are not a basis on which a special duty may be premised … . Coleman v County of Suffolk, 2021 NY Slip Op 08219, Second Dept 3-17-21

 

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