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Police Officer Who Refused a Light-Duty Assignment Was Not Entitled to Disability Benefits Pursuant to General Municipal Law 207-c

The Second Department determined a police officer was not entitled to refuse a light duty assignment during the period his entitlement to disability benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law 207-c was being determined:

A disabled officer receiving General Municipal Law § 207-c benefits is entitled to a due process hearing before those benefits may be terminated when the officer submits medical evidence contesting the finding of a municipality’s appointed physician that the officer is fit for duty … . Once such evidence has been submitted, an “order to report for duty may not be enforced, or benefits terminated, pending resolution of an administrative hearing, which itself is subject to review under CPLR article 78” … . However, where the municipality’s physician is of the opinion that the officer is able “to perform specified types of light police duty,” payment of the full amount of salary or wages may be discontinued should the officer refuse to perform such light police duty if same “is available and offered to [the officer]” and enables him or her “to continue to be entitled to his [or her] regular salary or wages” (General Municipal Law § 207-c[3]…). If an officer who refuses to return to light duty fails to provide medical proof that he or she is unable to do so, the municipality may discontinue disability payments without a hearing … . Matter of Garvey v Sullivan, 2015 NY Slip Op 05476, 2nd Dept 6-24-15

 

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