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THE COMPLAINT SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED A DEFAMATION CAUSE OF ACTION; THE DEFENDANT ALLEGEDLY TOLD PLAINTIFF’S PHYSICIAN THAT PLAINTIFF WAS BANNED FROM DEFENDANT’S PHARMACY FOR STEALING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff had alleged a defamation cause of action and the motion to dismiss should not have been granted. Plaintiff alleged defendant falsely accused him of stealing newspapers from a pharmacy:

The plaintiff alleged, among other things, that in November 2020, he was a customer at a CVS store in Jericho, where the defendant Martin was employed as a pharmacist. The plaintiff further alleged that, on December 3, 2020, Martin informed his physician, inter alia, that the plaintiff was banned from the pharmacy for stealing newspapers on multiple occasions and that she had reported the plaintiff to the police. * * *

… [T]he complaint alleged that the statement that the plaintiff was banned from the pharmacy in question for stealing was made on December 3, 2020. The complaint also set forth the statement allegedly made and to whom the statement was made … . Contrary to the defendants’ contention, “the words need not be set in quotation marks” to state a cause of action to recover damages for defamation … . Moreover, the allegation that the plaintiff “was stealing” “constitutes an allegation of a ‘serious crime’ so as to qualify as slander per se” … . Jesberger v CVS Health Solutions, LLC, 2023 NY Slip Op 06515, Second Dept 12-20-23

Practice Point: The allegation that defendant told plaintiff’s physician that plaintiff was banned from defendant’s pharmacy for stealing sufficiently stated a cause of action for defamation.

 

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