You are here: / / Defendant’s Consent to the Substitution of a Juror Was Not Knowingly...

Defendant’s Consent to the Substitution of a Juror Was Not Knowingly and Intelligently Given, Reversal Required

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Chambers, determined the defendant’s consent to the substitution of a juror was not knowingly and intelligently given and reversal was required (despite the absence of an objection).  The defendant was not present when defense counsel consented to the substitution and deliberations resumed.  When the defendant arrived, he consented to the substitution.  In the mean time, however, the jury had reached a verdict.  But the trial judge had not informed the defendant a verdict had been reached at the time the defendant was asked for his consent to the substitution:

“[T]he safeguards afforded by CPL 270.35 are identical to and coextensive with the constitutional requirements for valid waiver of a jury trial” … . The decision to allow an alternate juror to be substituted for a deliberating juror must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary … . The defendant must be “fully aware of the consequences of the choice he [or she] is making” … . In determining whether a defendant’s decision to consent to the substitution of an alternate juror for a deliberating juror is “made knowingly and understandingly, based on an intelligent, informed judgment” …, a court is required to be ” scrupulous,'” for at stake is the defendant’s “fundamental, constitutional right to a jury of 12” … . Here, the defendant’s election to substitute the alternate juror for the deliberating juror was not based on an intelligent, informed judgment. No matter how well-intentioned the trial court was in not disclosing the fact that the jury had already reached a verdict, due process required the trial court to disclose to the defendant all of the pertinent, material facts. People v Canales, 2014 NY Slip Op 04508, 2nd Dept 6-18-14

 

You might also like
DEFENDANT LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY FAILED TO FILE ITS CURRENT ADDRESS WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE SINCE 2011; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT ALLEGING IT WAS NOT SERVED WITH THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S INJURIES IN THIS STUDENT-PUSHES-STUDENT CASE (SECOND DEPT).
SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT SIGNATURES ON THE NOTE AND DEFENDANTS’ DENIAL OF RECEIPT OF THE RPAPL 1304 NOTICE DID NOT RAISE QUESTIONS OF FACT; THE BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
AFTER FATHER’S DEATH, SON COULD NOT SEEK AN INJUNCTION AGAINST MOTHER AND SUE MOTHER FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT BASED UPON MOTHER AND FATHER’S AGREEMENT NOT TO MODIFY OR REVOKE THEIR WILLS WITHOUT THE MUTUAL CONSENT OF THE PARTIES.
Some of the Requirements for the Application of Attorney Work-Product and Trial-Preparation Privileges Explained
GRANDMOTHER SHOULD HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED OF HER RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN THIS CUSTODY CASE; MATTER SENT BACK TO FAMILY COURT TO DETERMINE WHETHER GRANDMOTHER WAS ELIGIBLE FOR ASSIGNED COUNSEL (THIRD DEPT).
GRIEVANCE FILED AGAINST SCHOOL DISTRICT REGARDING THE DISTRICT’S STARTING A PLENARY ACTION AGAINST A TEACHER UNDER A FAITHLESS SERVANT THEORY WAS ARBITRABLE UNDER THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT.
IN A HYBRID ACTION SEEKING AN ANNULMENT PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 78 AND A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT (AND DAMAGES), THE BURDENS TO DEMONSTRATE STANDING ARE DIFFERENT; IN AN ARTICLE 78 THE PETITIONER MUST AFFIRMATIVELY DEMONSTRATE STANDING; AND IN A DECLARTORY-JUDGMENT/DAMAGES ACTION, THE RESPONDENT (DEFENDANT) MUST DEMONSTRATE PETITIONER DOES NOT HAVE STANDING AS A MATTER OF LAW TO WARRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Constructive Trust Cause of Action Sufficiently Pled/Dismissal “With Prejudice”... Providing a False Name During Booking Did Not Trigger the Need for a Miranda...