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Defendant’s Consent to the Substitution of a Juror Was Not Knowingly and Intelligently Given, Reversal Required

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Chambers, determined the defendant’s consent to the substitution of a juror was not knowingly and intelligently given and reversal was required (despite the absence of an objection).  The defendant was not present when defense counsel consented to the substitution and deliberations resumed.  When the defendant arrived, he consented to the substitution.  In the mean time, however, the jury had reached a verdict.  But the trial judge had not informed the defendant a verdict had been reached at the time the defendant was asked for his consent to the substitution:

“[T]he safeguards afforded by CPL 270.35 are identical to and coextensive with the constitutional requirements for valid waiver of a jury trial” … . The decision to allow an alternate juror to be substituted for a deliberating juror must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary … . The defendant must be “fully aware of the consequences of the choice he [or she] is making” … . In determining whether a defendant’s decision to consent to the substitution of an alternate juror for a deliberating juror is “made knowingly and understandingly, based on an intelligent, informed judgment” …, a court is required to be ” scrupulous,'” for at stake is the defendant’s “fundamental, constitutional right to a jury of 12” … . Here, the defendant’s election to substitute the alternate juror for the deliberating juror was not based on an intelligent, informed judgment. No matter how well-intentioned the trial court was in not disclosing the fact that the jury had already reached a verdict, due process required the trial court to disclose to the defendant all of the pertinent, material facts. People v Canales, 2014 NY Slip Op 04508, 2nd Dept 6-18-14

 

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