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LAND HELD BY A MUNICIPALITY IN A PROPRIETARY CAPACITY IS NOT IMMUNE FROM ADVERSE POSSESSION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the complaint seeking a declaration that plaintiff is the owner, by adverse possession, of land adjacent to municipal railway tracks states a cause of action. The court explained that land held by a municipality in a proprietary capacity, as opposed to a governmental capacity, is not immune from adverse possession:

Although a municipality cannot lose title through adverse possession to property which it owns in its governmental capacity, or which has been made inalienable by statute… , when a municipality holds real property in its proprietary capacity, there is no immunity against adverse possession … . Here, the [municipality] did not conclusively establish that the property is not subject to adverse possession on the basis of governmental immunity. Mazzei v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 2018 NY Slip Op 06007, Second Dept 9-12-18

MUNICIPAL LAW (LAND HELD BY A MUNICIPALITY IN A PROPRIETARY CAPACITY IS NOT IMMUNE FROM ADVERSE POSSESSION (SECOND DEPT))/REAL PROPERTY LAW (ADVERSE POSSESSION, MUNICIPAL LAW, (LAND HELD BY A MUNICIPALITY IN A PROPRIETARY CAPACITY IS NOT IMMUNE FROM ADVERSE POSSESSION (SECOND DEPT))/IMMUNITY (MUNICIPAL LAW, ADVERSE POSSESSION, LAND HELD BY A MUNICIPALITY IN A PROPRIETARY CAPACITY IS NOT IMMUNE FROM ADVERSE POSSESSION (SECOND DEPT))/ADVERSE POSSESSION (MUNICIPAL LAW, ADVERSE POSSESSION, LAND HELD BY A MUNICIPALITY IN A PROPRIETARY CAPACITY IS NOT IMMUNE FROM ADVERSE POSSESSION (SECOND DEPT))/PROPRIETARY CAPACITY (MUNICIPAL LAW, ADVERSE POSSESSION, (LAND HELD BY A MUNICIPALITY IN A PROPRIETARY CAPACITY IS NOT IMMUNE FROM ADVERSE POSSESSION (SECOND DEPT))

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