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THE COVID EXECUTIVE ORDERS TOLLING THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS APPLY TO THE TIME FOR ANSWERING A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN LIEU OF COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the COVID executive orders tolling the statute of limitations applied to the time to oppose a motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint:

In Brash v Richards, this Court determined that Executive Order 202.8 and the subsequent executive orders acted to toll those specific time limits contained in the CPLR and listed in the executive orders … . Executive Order 202.8 and the subsequent executive orders “appear to apply to the service of the notice of appearance” … , but “do[ ] not expressly apply to toll the defendant’s time to serve an answer” … . However, given the hybrid nature of the “motion-action” under CPLR 3213, in which the filing of answering papers is akin to the service of a notice of appearance or an answer … , combined with the desire to preserve the status quo for litigants during the COVID-19 pandemic … , under Executive Order 202.8 and the subsequent executive orders, neither defendant was required to appear and file answering papers … . Blue Lagoon, LLC v Reisman, 2023 NY Slip Op 01657, Second Dept 3-29-23

Practice Point: COVID executive orders tolling statutes of limitations apply to the time to answer a motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint.

 

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