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RE: DETERMINING THE CORRECT JURISDICTION FOR STATUTE-OF-LIMITATIONS PURPOSES, THE ACCRUAL OF A BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION ALLEGING PURELY ECONOMIC INJURY IS USUALLY IN THE “PLACE OF INJURY,” WHICH IS USUALLY WHERE THE PLAINTIFF RESIDES (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a decision too complex to fairly summarize here, noted that for breach of contract actions alleging purely economic injury the claims accrue in the “place of injury,” usually plaintiff’s residence:

… Supreme Court should not have found that the claims accrued in New York and were timely under New York’s six-year statute of limitations. In contract cases involving a purely economic injury, accrual is determined by the “place of injury,” which usually is determined by applying the “plaintiff-residence” rule; this rule asks where the plaintiff resides and where it feels the economic impact of the loss … . MLRN LLC v U.S. Bank, N.A., 2023 NY Slip Op 01748, First Dept 3-30-23

Practice Point: A breach of contract action alleging purely economic injury usually accrues in the “place of injury” which is usually where plaintiff resides.

 

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