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HERE THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT WHEN THE PLAINTIFFS BECAME AWARE OF THE ALLEGED FRAUD; THEREFORE THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS TIME-BARRED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there was a question of fact concerning when the plaintiffs became aware of the alleged fraud. Therefore the complaint should not have been dismissed as time-barred:

Fraud claims must be commenced within “the greater of six years from the date the cause of action accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff . . . discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it” (CPLR 213[8]). * * *

Assuming, arguendo, that defendants met their prima facie burden on the motion, an issue of fact exists as to whether plaintiffs were on inquiry notice of the fraud more than two years before they commenced the action … . Murray v Stone, 2023 NY Slip Op 01749, First Dept 3-30-23

Practice Point:  A fraud action must be brought within six years of accrual or two years of discovery of the fraud.

 

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