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PREJUDGMENT INTEREST NEED NOT BE PAID INTO THE COURT PURSUANT TO CPLR 2601 WHEN SUCH A PAYMENT IS MADE TO STOP THE ACCRUAL OF INTEREST.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant need not pay prejudgment interest when it paid the policy limits into the court pursuant to CPLR 2601 to stop the accrual of interest on that amount:

In this action to recover damages for medical malpractice, after a jury trial, a judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiffs and against, among others, the defendant New York Methodist Hospital (hereinafter NYMH) in the total present value sum of $13,815,290. In an order dated September 24, 2014, the Supreme Court granted NYMH’s motion pursuant to CPLR 2601, inter alia, for leave to pay the limits of its insurance policy, $7,500,000, into court in order to stop the accrual of interest on that amount. * * *

… CPLR 2601 does not mandate that any specific amount of money be paid into court or require that interest on the amount to be paid into court from the date of the verdict to the date of deposit be paid at or around the time of deposit. Therefore, NYMH was not required to pay into court an additional $619,520.55, which represented the accrued interest from the date of the verdict to the date of deposit. Accordingly, the order must be reversed. Sence v Atoynatan, 2016 NY Slip Op 05804, 2nd Dept 8-17-16

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (PREJUDGMENT INTEREST NEED NOT BE PAID INTO THE COURT PURSUANT TO CPLR 2601 WHEN SUCH A PAYMENT IS MADE TO STOP THE ACCRUAL OF INTEREST)/PREJUDGMENT INTEREST (PREJUDGMENT INTEREST NEED NOT BE PAID INTO THE COURT PURSUANT TO CPLR 2601 WHEN SUCH A PAYMENT IS MADE TO STOP THE ACCRUAL OF INTEREST)/INTEREST (PREJUDGMENT INTEREST NEED NOT BE PAID INTO THE COURT PURSUANT TO CPLR 2601 WHEN SUCH A PAYMENT IS MADE TO STOP THE ACCRUAL OF INTEREST)

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EVEN IF ANIMAL SHELTER FAILED TO INFORM PLAINTIFF OF THE DOG’S VICIOUS... JUDGE’S FAILURE TO ADDRESS JURY NOTES BEFORE THE VERDICT NOT REVIEWED...