You are here: / / FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE REFUSED TO ALLOW FATHER TO REPRESENT HIMSELF...
,

FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE REFUSED TO ALLOW FATHER TO REPRESENT HIMSELF IN THIS CUSTODY PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined father’s desire to represent himself in this custody proceeding should have been honored by the court. Family Court had ordered that father be allowed only supervised visitation until he retained counsel:

The father had a statutory right to counsel in these Family Court proceedings… . However, he also had the right to waive counsel and proceed pro se, provided he waived his right to counsel knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily… . “Where a respondent has made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary choice to represent himself or herself, forcing a lawyer upon [him or her] is contrary to his [or her] basic right to defend himself [or herself]'” … .

Where a party unequivocally and timely asserts the right to self-representation, the court must conduct a searching inquiry to ensure that the waiver of the right to counsel is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary … . “While there is no rigid formula to the court’s inquiry, there must be a showing that the party was aware of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel” … . The Court of Appeals has stated that the better practice is to ask the party about his or her age, education, occupation, previous exposure to legal procedures, and other relevant factors bearing on a competent, intelligent, and voluntary waiver … .

Here, the father unequivocally and timely asserted his right to represent himself in the Family Court proceedings. The Family Court engaged in a searching inquiry of the father, which revealed that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, and that it was his desire and personal choice to proceed pro se. The court properly warned him of the perils of self-representation, which he acknowledged. The father is a tax attorney, and his relative ignorance of family law did not justify the court’s denial of his request, as mere ignorance of the law is insufficient to deprive one of the right to self-representation … . Matter of Aleman v Lansch, 2018 NY Slip Op 01303, Second Dept, 2-28-18

FAMILY LAW (FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE REFUSED TO ALLOW FATHER TO REPRESENT HIMSELF IN THIS CUSTODY PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT))/CUSTODY (FAMILY LAW, FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE REFUSED TO ALLOW FATHER TO REPRESENT HIMSELF IN THIS CUSTODY PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (FAMILY LAW, FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE REFUSED TO ALLOW FATHER TO REPRESENT HIMSELF IN THIS CUSTODY PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT))/PRO SE (FAMILY LAW, FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE REFUSED TO ALLOW FATHER TO REPRESENT HIMSELF IN THIS CUSTODY PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT))

You might also like
DEFENDANT DID NOT ELIMINATE QUESTIONS OF FACT CONCERNING WHETHER IT HAD ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ALLEGEDLY DANGEROUS CONDITION IN THIS ESCALATOR SLIP AND FALL CASE, ANY CONFLICT IN PLAINTIFF’S TESTIMONY DID NOT RENDER IT INCREDIBLE AS A MATTER OF LAW, DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
CONTINUOUS TREATMENT TOLLS THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WHEN THE INITIAL ERRONEOUS DIAGNOSIS IS OUTSIDE THE STATUTE AND THE CONTINUED TREATMENT WAS BY OTHER DOCTORS IN THE GROUP.
Father’s Consent to Adoption Not Required
PLAINTIFF IN THIS STRICT FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT TO ADD A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR REFORECLOSURE UNDER RPAPL 1503; REFORECLOSURE IS AN OPTION WHEN THE ORIGINAL FORECLOSURE MAY BE VOID OR VOIDABLE AS AGAINST ANY PERSON (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANT TRANSIT AUTHORITY’S NEGLIGENCE FURNISHED THE CONDITION FOR PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S DEATH BUT WAS NOT THE CAUSE OF HIS DEATH, DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE SUBSTANTIAL VERDICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
CREDIT UNION WHICH HOLDS SECURITY INTERESTS IN OVER 1400 TAXICAB MEDALLIONS DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CONTEST THE NEW YORK CITY TAXI AND LIMOUSINE COMMISSION’S (TLC’S) RULING ALLOWING UBER TO PICK UP PASSENGERS VIA SMARTPHONE (SECOND DEPT).
JUDGES IN THE 2ND DEPARTMENT HAVE THE DISCRETION TO ORDER UNIFIED PERSONAL INJURY TRIALS WHERE THE ISSUES OF LIABILITY AND THE INJURIES ARE INTERTWINED AS THEY WERE IN THIS CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENT CASE; DEFENSE VERDICT SET ASIDE AND A NEW UNIFIED TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).
County Not Necessary Party In Suit to Recover Taxes Wrongfully Paid to Town

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THE AUTOMATIC ORDERS WHICH PRECLUDE TRANSFER OF MARITAL PROPERTY WHILE DIVORCE... FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS UNTIMELY FOR TWO DISTINCT...