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SUPREME COURT WAS WITHOUT POWER TO DIRECT DISMISSAL OF THE FORECLOSURE ACTION FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE BECAUSE A 90-DAY NOTICE HAD NOT BEEN SERVED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the foreclosure action should not have been dismissed for failure to prosecute because a 90-day notice had not been served:

In April 2009, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant Melchior Sansone (hereinafter the defendant), among others, to foreclose a mortgage secured by certain real property located in Suffolk County. In January 2011, following settlement conferences, the action was released from the foreclosure settlement conference part without any resolution. On July 20, 2012, the parties appeared at a compliance conference, at which time the Supreme Court directed the plaintiff to resume the prosecution of this action. By order dated November 21, 2012 (hereinafter the dismissal order), the court directed dismissal of the action upon the plaintiff’s failure to resume prosecution of the action. The plaintiff subsequently moved to vacate the dismissal order, and, in effect, to restore the action to the active calendar. By order dated July 30, 2018, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion, and the plaintiff appeals.

“A court may not dismiss an action based on neglect to prosecute unless the statutory preconditions to dismissal, as articulated in CPLR 3216, are met” … . These conditions include, among others, service of a written demand “requiring the party against whom such relief is sought to resume prosecution of the action and to serve and file a note of issue within ninety days after receipt of such demand” (CPLR 3216[b][3] …). Here, the Supreme Court was without power to direct dismissal of the action on the ground of failure to prosecute because the plaintiff was not served with a written demand to serve and file a note of issue within 90 days … . U.S. Bank N.A. v Sansone, 2019 NY Slip Op 07807, Second Dept 10-30-19

 

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PLAINTIFF SUBMITTED INSUFFICIENT PROOF THAT THE NOTICE REQUIRED BY RPAPL 1304... PLAINTIFF DID NOT SUBMIT SUFFICIENT PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH RPAPL 1304 AND...