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IN DENYING A SUPPRESSION MOTION THE JUDGE CAN CONSIDER EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY THE PEOPLE, EVEN IF THAT EVIDENCE WAS NOT EXPRESSLY RELIED UPON BY THE PEOPLE; OBSERVATION OF WHAT APPEARED TO BE A DRUG TRANSACTION PROVIDED PROBABLE CAUSE; THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT APPLIED; THE INVENTORY SEARCH WAS VALID (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department determined defendant’s motion to suppress tangible evidence was properly denied, finding (1) the suppression court could properly consider all the evidence presented by the People, even if the evidence was not expressly relied upon by the People; (2) although the vehicle occupants were seized at the time the police approached, the officers’ prior observation of what appeared to be a drug transaction provided probable cause; (3) the search of the vehicle was justified by the automobile exception; and (4) the inventory search was lawful:

… [W]e conclude that the court was entitled to consider legal justifications that were supported by the evidence, even if they were not raised explicitly by the People (see CPL 710.60 [6] …). “By presenting evidence sufficient to support the court’s findings, the People met their burden of going forward . . . and the court may rely on any legal justification for police conduct for which there is factual support in the record” … . …

… .[B]efore defendant’s seizure, an officer observed defendant conduct what, based on his training and experience, appeared to be a hand-to-hand drug transaction, even though he “couldn’t tell” what “items” he had seen during the exchange other than money. Additionally, that officer was in the area conducting surveillance on an unrelated narcotics investigation, raising the inference that the transaction occurred in a drug-prone area. Furthermore, once two other officers approached the vehicle based on the above observations, one officer saw packaging material of the kind used to store narcotics, and the other officer observed that the driver of the vehicle engaged in “furtive” behavior. Based on the totality of those factors, we conclude that the police had probable cause to believe that defendant engaged in a narcotics offense justifying the stop of the vehicle and his arrest … . …

“The [automobile] exception requires both probable cause to search the automobile generally and a nexus between the probable cause to search and the crime for which the arrest is being made’ ” … . Based on the foregoing, at the time of the search, the police had probable cause to believe that narcotics or packaging materials used in the sale and possession of narcotics were present in the vehicle … . Thus, inasmuch as there was a nexus between the probable cause to search the vehicle and the crime for which defendant was being arrested, we conclude that the police were not required to obtain a warrant … . People v Nichols, 2019 NY Slip Op 06361, Fourth Dept 8-22-19

 

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