You are here: / / DECEDENT, WHO DIED TESTATE IN 2004, WAS AWARDED COMPENSATION BY CONGRESS...

DECEDENT, WHO DIED TESTATE IN 2004, WAS AWARDED COMPENSATION BY CONGRESS IN 2015 BECAUSE HER HUSBAND HAD BEEN HELD IN IRAN AS A HOSTAGE FROM 1979 TO 1981; BECAUSE THE COMPENSATION WAS AWARDED AFTER HER DEATH, IT DOES NOT PASS BY WILL, BUT RATHER BY THE LAWS OF INTESTACY (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Surrogate’s Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Centra, determined the funds awarded by Congress to the decedent, after the decedent’s death, do not pass by decedent’s will, but rather by the laws of intestacy. Decedent, who died in 2004, was the wife of a man held hostage in Iran from 1979 to 1981. In 2015 Congress awarded compensation to the hostages’ families:

Regarding property acquired by an estate after the death of the testator, case law is sparse, but is consistent with the language in EPTL 3-3.1 providing that only property that a testator is entitled to devise “at the time of his [or her] death” may be distributed pursuant to the terms of the will … . We are particularly persuaded by the decision in Shaw Family Archives Ltd. , which involved a dispute over ownership interest in Marilyn Monroe’s right of publicity after her death. The court determined that New York law did not permit a testator to dispose by will of property that she did not own at the time of her death … . The court cited to EPTL 3-3.1 and held that “[t]he corollary principle recognized by the courts is that property not owned by the testator at the time of his [or her] death is not subject to disposition by will” … .

We agree with the reasoning in Shaw Family Archives Ltd. that the New York rule is grounded in the testator’s lack of capacity to devise property he or she does not own at the time of death … . Matter of Keough, 2021 NY Slip Op 03948, Fourth Dept 6-17-21

 

You might also like
THE CHOICE OF FORUM CLAUSE (ARIZONA) IN THE CONTRACT IS ENFORCEABLE AND IS NOT AFFECTED BY AN ARGUMENT QUESTIONING THE VALIDITY OF A CHOICE OF LAW CLAUSE; THE FACT THAT THE NEW YORK PLAINTIFF WILL HAVE TO TRAVEL TO ARIZONA DOES NOT AFFECT THE ENFORCEABILITY OF THE CHOICE OF FORUM CLAUSE (FOURTH DEPT).
SHERIFF IS NOT VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR EMPLOYEES OF THE SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT; SHERIFF, THEREFORE, IS NOT UNITED IN INTEREST WITH THE SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT OR THE COUNTY; RELATION-BACK DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY; SHERIFF CANNOT BE ADDED TO THE COMPLAINT AFTER THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAS RUN.
DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED OF ASSAULT ON A PEACE OFFICER AND ASSAULT SECOND; THE ASSAULT SECOND CONVICTION WAS REVERSED BECAUSE (1) ASSAULT SECOND IS AN INCLUSORY CONCURRENT COUNT OF ASSAULT ON A PEACE OFFICER, AND (2) ASSAULT SECOND IS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF ASSAULT ON A PEACE OFFICER (FOURTH DEPT).
THE DEFENDANT’S STATEMENTS MADE TO A CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES CASEWORKER SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED; THE CASEWORKER, UNDER THE FACTS, ACTED AS AN AGENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT DURING THE INTERVIEW (FOURTH DEPT).
FATHER AND MOTHER SUBMITTED INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THEIR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS ON THE ISSUE WHETHER THE CHILDREN WERE CONSTRUCTIVELY EMANCIPATED; FATHER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS PETITION TO TERMINATE HIS CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS WAS PROPERLY DENIED BUT MOTHER’S PETITION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING FATHER’S PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).
PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY HAD REPRESENTED THE DEFENDANT IN THIS CASE IN A MATTER INVOLVING SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR ALLEGATIONS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE; THE MOTION TO DISQUALIFY PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY AND THE ATTORNEY’S SMALL LAW FIRM SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).
FOR CAUSE CHALLENGE TO JUROR, BASED UPON IMPLIED BIAS, SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, JUROR’S LIFE WAS SAVED BY THE TRAUMA SURGEON WHO TESTIFIED ABOUT THE VICTIM’S WOUNDS, MULTIPLE STAB WOUNDS DID NOT SUPPORT LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF RECKLESS ASSAULT (FOURTH DEPT).
MANSLAUGHTER FIRST DEGREE IS NOT AN “ARMED FELONY” WITHIN THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW 720.10; COUNTY COURT WAS REQUIRED TO DETERMINE WHETHER DEFENDANT SHOULD BE AFFORDED YOUTHFUL OFFENDER STATUS; MATTER REMITTED (FOURTH DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

HUSBAND’S PROCEEDS FROM THE SALE OF STOCK DID NOT LOSE THEIR SEPARATE-PROPERTY... SENTENCE MUST BE PRONOUNCED ON EACH COUNT OF THE CONVICTION; SENTENCE VACATED...