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EMAILS INADVERTENTLY PROVIDED TO PLAINTIFF WERE NOT PROTECTED BY ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ISSUED A PROTECTIVE ORDER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that emails which had inadvertently been provided to the plaintiff were not protected by attorney-client privilege. Therefore Supreme Court should not have granted a protective order pursuant to CPLR 3101 (b):

… [T]he defendants failed to meet their burden of establishing a right to protection of the subject emails … . The communications relate to the business of the defendants, rather than legal issues … , and nothing stated by in-house counsel in the emails sets him apart as a legal advisor in the discussion. The affidavits of the defendants’ CEO and in-house counsel, submitted in support of the cross motion, merely state in a conclusory manner that the communications were confidential and privileged. The defendants point to no particular communication in which in-house counsel gave legal advice, or in which the defendants’ other employees sought legal advice from in-house counsel. Saran v Chelsea GCA Realty Partnership, L.P., 2019 NY Slip Op 05710, Second Dept 7-17-19

 

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