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You are here: Home1 / Medical Malpractice2 / THE “LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT” CAUSE OF ACTION IN THIS MEDICAL...
Medical Malpractice, Negligence

THE “LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT” CAUSE OF ACTION IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SUIT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE PLAINTIFF INSISTED ON THE PROCEDURE DESPITE THE RISKS OR DECLINED ANY PROFFERED EXPLANATION OF THE RISKS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court) determined the “lack of informed consent” to back surgery (implantation of an X-STOP device) should not have been dismissed:

As a defense to a medical malpractice action premised upon lack of informed consent, a practitioner may proffer evidence that “the patient assured the medical . . . practitioner that he [or she] would undergo the treatment, procedure or diagnosis regardless of the risk involved, or the patient assured the medical . . . practitioner that he [or she] did not want to be informed of the matters to which he [or she] would be entitled to be informed” (Public Health Law § 2805-d[4][b]). Here, although [plaintiff’s] deposition testimony made clear that he deferred to [defendant surgeon’s] judgment as to whether he should undergo a procedure and, if so, which procedure, it does not establish that [plaintiff] either insisted on the procedure to implant the X-STOP devices, rather than other treatment options, regardless of risk, or that he refused any proffered advice. On the contrary, the record establishes that, far from insisting on a contraindicated procedure, [plaintiff] relied upon [defendant surgeon’s] professional expertise in determining the correct course of treatment. Likewise, although [defendant surgeon’s] testimony establishes that he explained the benefits of performing the procedure to implant the X-STOP devices rather than a laminectomy, he did not testify that he offered, or that [plaintiff] declined, any proffered explanation of the risks and limitations of the procedure to implant the X-STOP devices. Mirshah v Obedian, 2021 NY Slip Op 06994, Second Dept 12-15-21

 

December 15, 2021
Tags: Second Department
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https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2021-12-15 15:22:272021-12-20 15:23:53THE “LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT” CAUSE OF ACTION IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SUIT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE PLAINTIFF INSISTED ON THE PROCEDURE DESPITE THE RISKS OR DECLINED ANY PROFFERED EXPLANATION OF THE RISKS (SECOND DEPT).
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