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You are here: Home1 / Civil Procedure2 / PLAINTIFF DID NOT PROVE DEFENDANT OWNER OF DEFENDANT CORPORATION WAS PROPERLY...
Civil Procedure, Corporation Law, Employment Law

PLAINTIFF DID NOT PROVE DEFENDANT OWNER OF DEFENDANT CORPORATION WAS PROPERLY SERVED WITH THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT BY SUBSTITUTE SERVICE; EVEN PROPER SUBSTITUTE SERVICE WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO ACQUIRE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER A CORPORATION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant owner of defendant corporation (Tatiana Batin) and the corporation (Godess … Spa …) were not properly served with the summons and complaint in this action alleging an employee of defendant corporation sexually abused plaintiff during a massage:

… [P]laintiff failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Batin was properly served with the summons and complaint pursuant to CPLR 308(2). The hearing evidence established that the address at which Batin was purportedly served pursuant to CPLR 308(2) was neither her actual dwelling place nor her usual place of abode as of the purported date of service … . Contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, “‘[e]ven if a defendant eventually acquires actual notice of the lawsuit, actual notice alone will not sustain the service or subject a person to the court’s jurisdiction when there has not been compliance with prescribed conditions of service'” … .

… [P]laintiff failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Goddess was properly served pursuant to CPLR 311(a)(1), which required delivery of the summons and complaint to “an officer, director, managing or general agent, or . . . any other agent authorized . . . to receive service.” “Personal service on a corporation must be made to one of the persons authorized by the statute to accept service, and an attempt to serve such person by substitute service pursuant to CPLR 308(2) or (4) will be insufficient to acquire jurisdiction over the corporation” … . Here, even assuming, arguendo, that Batin had been properly served pursuant to CPLR 308(2), substituted service upon her pursuant to CPLR 308(2) would be insufficient to acquire personal jurisdiction over Goddess, as CPLR 311(a)(1) requires personal service directly upon a corporate representative … . Flatow v Goddess Sanctuary & Spa Corp., 2024 NY Slip Op 06029, Second Dept 12-4-24

Practice Point: At the hearing plaintiff did not prove defendant owner of defendant corporation was properly served with the summons and complaint by substitute service.

Practice Point: Personal jurisdiction over a corporation cannot be acquired by substitute service.

 

December 4, 2024
Tags: Second Department
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https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2024-12-04 09:58:472024-12-08 10:26:58PLAINTIFF DID NOT PROVE DEFENDANT OWNER OF DEFENDANT CORPORATION WAS PROPERLY SERVED WITH THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT BY SUBSTITUTE SERVICE; EVEN PROPER SUBSTITUTE SERVICE WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO ACQUIRE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER A CORPORATION (SECOND DEPT).
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