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LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTION BROUGHT BY A NEW JERSEY RESIDENT IS UNTIMELY PURSUANT TO NEW YORK’S BORROWING STATUTE, NEW YORK’S SHORTER STATUTE O

The First Department determined Supreme Court properly applied New York’s borrowing statute (CPLR 202) and chose the shorter of the statutes of limitations for a legal malpractice action. New York’s statute is three years and New Jersey’s is six years. Plaintiff was a New Jersey resident:

The court correctly found the complaint time-barred under CPLR 202, New York’s “borrowing statute,” which requires a claim to be timely under both the New York limitations period and that of the jurisdiction where the claim is alleged to have arisen (Kat House Prods., LLC v Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, LLP, 71 AD3d 580[1st Dept 2010]).

Plaintiff, a New Jersey resident, alleged legal malpractice in connection with defendants’ representation of him for numerous real estate transactions, a cause of action which has a three year statute of limitations in New York (CPLR 214 [6]), and a six year limitations period in New Jersey (NJ Stat Ann § 2A:14-1). The latest that the alleged malpractice could have occurred was February 7, 2013, the date set for closing on the last of the real estate matters. Because plaintiff commenced the action on October 28, 2016, more than three years later, it was correctly dismissed as untimely. Soloway v Kane Kessler, PC, 2019 NY Slip Op 00026 [168 AD3d 407], First Dept 1-3-19

 

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