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CELL PHONE COMPANY WITNESS WAS NOT AN ENGINEER AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO TESTIFY AS AN EXPERT ABOUT HOW FAR DEFENDANT’S PHONE WAS FROM THE TOWER, POLICE OFFICER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO TESTIFY ABOUT THE VICTIM’S IDENTIFICATION OF THE DEFENDANT, JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE TO FAVOR THE PROSECUTION, THESE ERRORS, AS WELL AS ADDITIONAL JUDICIAL ERRORS, CUMULATIVELY DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, described a number of errors which had the cumulative effect of depriving defendant of a fair trial. Those errors include: (1) the witness from the cell phone company was not an engineer and therefore could not provide competent expert opinion about where defendant’s cell phone was in relation to the cell phone tower which picked up the signal; (2) a police officer should not have been allowed to testify that the victim had twice identified the defendant by name; (3) the charge to the jury improperly marshaled the identification evidence in a light favorable to the prosecution; (4) the court should have given the missing witness jury instruction for two lead detectives who had interviewed the victim and a witness; and (5) the judge should not have referenced the defendant’s failure to testify (twice). With respect to the cell tower and identification evidence, the court wrote:

“[T]estimony on how cell phone towers operate must be offered by an expert witness” because an analysis of the possible ranges of cell phone towers and how they operate is beyond a juror’s day-to-day experience and knowledge … . [The witness] was not an engineer and was not qualified, without an engineering background, to reach further conclusions about why defendant’s cell phone hit the Starling Avenue tower, i.e. whether it was because it was closest or strongest … . …

The trial court also permitted a police officer to testify twice, over defense objection, that the victim had identified her attacker as “male Hispanic, bald, by the name of Jose Ortiz.” This too was error. “Testimony by one witness (e.g., a police officer) to a previous identification of the defendant by another witness (e.g., a victim) is inadmissible” … . People v Ortiz, 2019 NY Slip Op 00221, First Dept 1-15-19

 

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