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DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR DECLINING THE COURT’S OFFER TO INSTRUCT THE JURY IT COULD DEVIATE FROM THE ACQUIT-FIRST RULE AFTER THE JURY INDICATED IT HAD DEADLOCKED ON THE TOP COUNT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined defense counsel was not ineffective for turning down the court’s offer to instruct the jury that it need not adhere to the “acquit-first” rule. The jury had sent out two notes indicating deadlock on the top count (murder):

Defendant also argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to accept the court’s offer, prompted by the prosecutor’s suggestion, to deviate from the “acquit-first” rule … , and allow the jury, which had submitted two deadlock notes as to the top charge of murder in the second degree, to consider the lesser included count of manslaughter in the first degree without first reaching a not guilty verdict on the higher charge. We need not decide whether, as the People argue, counsel’s choice categorically cannot be deemed professionally unreasonable because the procedure the court made available was clearly contrary to New York law. Rather, we find that the choice counsel faced was quintessentially a judgment call, involving a significant measure of instinct and intuition, and therefore that the course chosen cannot be deemed to lack any objectively reasonable strategic basis. For example, counsel could reasonably have believed, as the court indicated it did, that there was some possibility of acquittal on all counts if the course of deliberations was not interrupted by an instruction authorizing departure from the acquit-first rule. In any event, defendant has likewise failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel under either the state or federal standard. People v Tineo-Santos, 2018 NY Slip Op 02425, First Dept 4-10-18

​CRIMINAL LAW (ATTORNEYS, ACQUIT FIRST RULE, DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR DECLINING THE COURT’S OFFER TO INSTRUCT THE JURY IT COULD DEVIATE FROM THE ACQUIT-FIRST RULE AFTER THE JURY INDICATED IT HAD DEADLOCKED ON THE TOP COUNT (FIRST DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, ACQUIT FIRST RULE, DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR DECLINING THE COURT’S OFFER TO INSTRUCT THE JURY IT COULD DEVIATE FROM THE ACQUIT-FIRST RULE AFTER THE JURY INDICATED IT HAD DEADLOCKED ON THE TOP COUNT (FIRST DEPT))/INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE  (ACQUIT FIRST RULE, DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR DECLINING THE COURT’S OFFER TO INSTRUCT THE JURY IT COULD DEVIATE FROM THE ACQUIT-FIRST RULE AFTER THE JURY INDICATED IT HAD DEADLOCKED ON THE TOP COUNT (FIRST DEPT))/ACQUIT FIRST RULE (CRIMINAL LAW, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR DECLINING THE COURT’S OFFER TO INSTRUCT THE JURY IT COULD DEVIATE FROM THE ACQUIT-FIRST RULE AFTER THE JURY INDICATED IT HAD DEADLOCKED ON THE TOP COUNT (FIRST DEPT))/JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL LAW, ACQUIT FIRST RULE, DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR DECLINING THE COURT’S OFFER TO INSTRUCT THE JURY IT COULD DEVIATE FROM THE ACQUIT-FIRST RULE AFTER THE JURY INDICATED IT HAD DEADLOCKED ON THE TOP COUNT (FIRST DEPT))

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