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You are here: Home1 / Administrative Law2 / THE PUBLIC SERVICES COMMISSION HAS THE AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE RATE CAPS AND...
Administrative Law, Consumer Law, Environmental Law, Utilities

THE PUBLIC SERVICES COMMISSION HAS THE AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE RATE CAPS AND OTHER RESTRICTIONS ON ENERGY SERVICE COMPANIES WHICH USE THE PUBLIC UTILITY INFRASTRUCTURE TO DELIVER ELECTRICITY TO CONSUMERS (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, determined the Public Service Commission (PSC) has the authority to impose rate caps on energy service companies (ESCOs) who use the public utility infrastructure:

… [W]e are asked to determine whether the Public Service Law authorizes the Public Service Commission (PSC) to issue an order that conditions access to public utility infrastructure by energy service companies (ESCOs) upon ESCOs capping their prices such that, on an annual basis, they charge no more for electricity than is charged by public utilities unless 30% of the energy is derived from renewable sources. We conclude that the Public Service Law, in authorizing the PSC to set the conditions under which public utilities will transport consumer-owned electricity and gas, has such authority. * * *

Because the PSC is empowered to regulate utilities’ transportation of gas and electricity and created the ESCO markets for the benefit of consumers, and because the legislature has delegated to the PSC the authority to condition ESCOs’ eligibility to access utility lines on such terms and conditions that the PSC determines to be just and reasonable, it follows that the PSC has authority to prohibit utilities from distributing overpriced products by conditioning ESCOs’ access on a price cap. That is, the statutory framework permits the PSC, pursuant to its authority to regulate the energy market, to impose a price cap on ESCOs as a condition of eligibility. Therefore, although the PSC has no direct rate-making authority over ESCOs, it did not exceed its statutory authority in determining that public utility transportation of energy sold by ESCOs is not “just and reasonable” if ESCOs are charging consumers more than that charged by public utilities. Matter of National Energy Marketers Assn. v New York State Pub. Serv. Commn., 2019 NY Slip Op 03655, CtApp 5-9-19

 

May 7, 2019
Tags: Court of Appeals
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