You are here: / / Criteria for Motion to Renew Based on New Facts Not Met
,

Criteria for Motion to Renew Based on New Facts Not Met

In reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, the Second Department explained that CPLR 2221(a) had been misused to revisit a prior motion, and that the motion should have been brought under CPLR 2221 (e) as a motion for leave to renew based on new facts.  The motion should have been denied because the defendant failed to provide “reasonable justification” for the failure to present the “new” facts in the first motion:

The Supreme Court improperly granted the defendant’s motion, denominated as one pursuant to CPLR 2221(a) to modify the order entered September 28, 2011. CPLR 2221(a) merely provides that certain motions may be made, on notice, to the judge who signed the order that is the subject of the motion. In actuality, the defendant sought to present new facts in partial opposition to the motion for summary judgment, which were not presented on the initial motion. Thus, the defendant’s motion should have been made pursuant to CPLR 2221(e) for leave to renew its prior opposition to the motion for summary judgment, based upon new facts, and we construe it as such. However, the defendant failed to show its entitlement to that relief. The defendant failed to demonstrate “reasonable justification” for its failure to present such facts on the prior motion (CPLR 2221[e][2]). Mount Sinai Hosp v Dust Tr., Inc., 2013 NY Slip Op 01811, 2012-03767, Ind No 10715/10, 2nd Dept. 3-20-13

 

You might also like
IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE, THE DEFENDANT’S ALLEGATION HE DID NOT SEE PLAINTIFF’S BRAKE LIGHTS DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT (SECOND DEPT).
BANK DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304 IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION; THE BANK’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
Failure to Raise Denial of Constitutional Right to Present a Complete Defense Precluded Appeal
DEFENDANT REHABILITATION FACILITY WAS IMMUNE FROM SUIT PURSUANT TO THE EMERGENCY OR DISASTER TREATMENT PROTECTION ACT (EDTPA) RE: PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S COVID-RELATED INFECTION AND DEATH (SECOND DEPT). ​
EVEN CRIMINAL SLURS ARE NOT ACTIONABLE AS DEFAMATION IF THEY ARE PURE OPINION; HERE DEFENDANT’S TWEET ACCUSING PLAINTIFF OF MAKING “THREATS” WAS NOT ACTIONABLE (SECOND DEPT).
THE FOSTER CARE AGENCY DID NOT PROVE IT MADE DILIGENT EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE AND STRENGTHEN THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP BEFORE FILING THE PETITION TO TERMINATE MOTHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS; PETITION DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
THE PROCESS SERVER WAS AWARE DEFENDANT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS IN THE MILITARY; THE “AFFIX AND MAIL” METHOD OF SERVICE DID NOT OBTAIN JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT (SECOND DEPT).
Security at Homeless Shelter Is a Governmental Function–City Immune from Suit by Plaintiff Who Was Assaulted at the Shelter/Private Security Company Not Immune/Plaintiff Was a Third-Party Beneficiary of the Contract Between the Department of Homeless Services and the Security Company/Security Company Did Not Demonstrate It Was Free from Negligence and the Assault Was Not Foreseeable

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Court’s Sua Sponte Dismissal of Complaint Reversed Criteria for Dismissal of Cause of Action Based on Documentary Evidence Explained...