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Criteria for Dismissal of Cause of Action Based on Documentary Evidence Explained 

The Second Department, in reversing the dismissal of causes of action in a complaint, explained the criteria for dismissal based on documentary evidence:

A motion to dismiss based on documentary evidence pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) may be appropriately granted “only where the documentary evidence utterly refutes plaintiff’s factual allegations, conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law” … . Here, to the extent that the sponsor’s submissions constituted “documentary evidence” within the meaning of CPLR 3211(a)(1) …, they failed to utterly refute the cooperative’s allegations … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied those branches of the sponsor’s motion which were to dismiss the first, second, and fourth causes of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1). North Shore Towers Apts. Inc. v Three Towers Assoc., 2013 NY Slip Op 01812, 2012-00848, Index No 11834/10, 2nd Dept. 3-20-13​

 

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